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Hispanic Migrant Labor in Oregon, 1940-1990, describes the history and conditions of 
Hispanic farmworkers migrating from the southwestern United States, Mexico, and Latin 
America after the 1940s. This paper uncovers the history and contribution of a people 
easily forgotten, but essential to the well-being of the economy and the cultural diversity 
o f Oregon. Though much has been lost in the comings and the goings o f these people, 
bits and pieces have been recovered from old newspaper clippings, occasional documents
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recording the concerns and responses of the federal and state governments, rare articles 
tucked away in little known periodicals, and interviews.
A  history o f the migration and a general profile of the Hispanic migrant opens 
the paper, followed by a description of the health, housing, and work conditions. I then 
outline the migrants’ attempt to advance through education and to settle out. I describe 
the poverty they lived in and the treatment they generally received in society.
The next chapter details the external factors which affected the recruiting, hiring, 
and daily conditions of work. I assess the role o f the contractor, who was closely 
involved with the daily lives of the migrants and then explore the farmers and the 
economy in which they functioned in terms of the effect they had on the migrants. The 
government and its response to the migrants and its apparent philosophy and policies 
are studied. The efforts, as well o f lack of effort, of some of the government’s 
representatives are looked at as well.
In the third chapter, I describe the attempt o f members of the migrant 
community to care for one another. This covers both the cultural cohesiveness found 
within the community and union activism. It also includes the concerted efforts made by 
ex-migrants, Chicanos, and religious and secular activists.
The information obtained came from local newspapers, regional government 
documents, and journals found at the libraries of Portland State University, Reed 
College, Lewis and Clark College, and the Oregon Historical Society. Interviews are 
also included as well as invaluable theses and dissertations from students of Northwest 
academic institutions.
This research found that Hispanic farmworkers played an important role in the 
agricultural economy of Oregon. They did not, however, receive fair retribution.
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Farmworkers’ wages and conditions remained substandard. They were not protected by 
the National Labor Relations Act and state government left their conditions unregulated 
as well.
The role of the growers and contractors also remained unchecked, leaving it to 
the discretion o f each individual involved, whose monetary interests often dictated his 
decision-making, regardless of its effects on the migrants. The economic outlook for 
migrants did and will continue to remain glum as long as competition within the 
American system and with corporations in the Third World persists, encouraging farmers 
to keep wages and the costs of benefits and camp conditions low.
On the other hand, the migrants’ culture, religion, and familial relations 
strengthened their ability to survive. Ex-migrants, community activists, and union 
activists also provided support, pushing for better conditions and rights for the migrants.
I have concluded that without a drastic change in the performance of the government 
and in the economic system, the cause of the inhumane migrant conditions will not be 
eliminated.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The people of Oregon live in one of the most plentiful regions o f the United 
States, where the soil is rich and the weather mild, making quality conditions for 
strawberries, pears, nuts and other crops. Although most don’t work or live in the 
farmland they depend on the fruits and vegetables grown and picked there.
For most people, the food magically appears. If an image exists it is one of a 
family farm, with country people gathering to pick the fruit, just as on the television 
commercials, while the real people who work the fields are silent, hidden, lost, 
somewhere between the fields and the fruitbowl placed on the kitchen table.
History, however, reveals a different scene -- impoverished Hispanic migrants, 
stooping, picking, hoeing and sorting the crops. Hour upon hour, for up to twelve hours 
each day, they toil, often in the hot sun or the cold, driving rain. Images o f the fields in 
which they work and live in do not come easily to mind for most Americans have never 
seen them. But the fact remains that the migrants play an integral part in the survival of 
each and evety Oregonian.
What has been left behind in written form tells the story of the rise and fall of 
the number of migrants passing through Oregon, toiling in the fields without reaping the 
profits gained on the farms, enduring through their own ingenuity. Since 1940 the 
number o f Hispanic migrants travelling to Oregon has risen consistently, outnumbering 
all others after the 1960s. What is written tells o f conditions painfully hard to accept,
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and of low wages few Americans would believe exist in the states. Recordings since 1940 
show the distress of Hispanic migrants’ daily lives caused by an economic system based 
on fierce competition. Under this capitalist economy contractors and struggling or 
corporate farms abandoned their responsibilities for housing and work conditions. For 
many reasons, including the stresses put upon them by the system they functioned within, 
those who used these people’s labor provided only a miniscule opportunity for them to 
make any, let alone significant, improvements in their lives. Yet, there is no doubt that 
without them Oregon farmers would not continue to survive or profit under the existing 
economic structure.
Although diligent individuals, sometimes united in groups, pushed for 
government protection of Hispanic farmworkers in Oregon, little resulted. Local 
governments lacked finances, as well as concern at times, and state and federal 
governments felt the lobbying pressures from agribusiness, leaving little incentive to act. 
Even when other migrant workers and distressed farmers were aided, mostly during the 
New Deal and World War II, the government offered very little help to Oregon migrant 
workers.
Instead of vulnerable, "tradition-bound indolent" workers, many of the 
Mexican-American migrants travelling out of the Southwest had to be, and were, 
"risk-taking entreprenuers who engaged in a geographically expanded economic 
occupation" (Wells 1976, 268). Initially many planned to make this merely a supplement 
to their regular income, to allow them to improve conditions for themselves and for their 
children. Some saved enough money to move out of the migrant stream. Others were 
able to provide their children with more training and education than they themselves had 
enjoyed.
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Unfortunately many more were unable to climb out of the cycle of poverty. Most 
of those who ventured to the Pacific Northwest continued to struggle to make ends 
meet. Joined together in family units, most remained under the control o f a contractor, 
which usually meant migrants lost even more money.
The histoiy and contribution o f Hispanic migrants in Oregon since 1940 remains 
largely untold. Though much has been lost with the comings and goings of these people, 
bits and pieces can be recovered from old newspaper clippings, occasional documents 
recording the concerns and responses of the federal and state government, rare articles 
tucked away in little known periodicals, and interviews.
It is important to view the histoiy of the Hispanic farmworker in Oregon 
chronologically. A general trend o f numbers and travel and recruitment procedures 
appears below. Settled Hispanic communities in rural Oregon and support systems that 
have helped the migrants have developed since 1940. Some change in the response of 
Oregon residents, especially in the rise of activists and volunteers has also occurred over 
time.
While some of this history fits into a chronological framework, much does not. 
That is to say, many aspects of this history have remained constant, persisting throughout 
time. Migrant wages, housing, work conditions, health, and success in education have all 
remained relatively consistent. As well, with few exceptions, contractors and farmers 
steadily maintained relations with the migrants that were destructive to the latter’s 
well-being economically and emotionally. Government response to the migrants’ plight 
was minimal throughout this time period. Because of the persistent trends in these areas 
a more thematic approach has been used.
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The history of Hispanic migrant labor dates back before 1940. Contextual 
information for the period after 1940 proves most relevant to the understanding o f their 
histoiy. The history of the migration and a general profile o f the Hispanic migrant 
opens the paper, followed by a description o f the health, housing and work conditions. I 
then outline the migrants’ attempt to advance through education and to settle out, 
leaving the migrant stream, describing their overwhelming poverty and the treatment 
they generally received in society.
The next chapter details the external factors which affected the recruiting, hiring 
and daily conditions of work. I assess the role of the contractor, who was closely 
involved with the daily lives of the migrants and then explore the fanners and the 
economy in which they function in terms of the effect they had on the migrants. The 
government and its response to the migrants and its apparent philosophy and policies 
are studied. The efforts, as well of lack of effort, of some of the government’s 
representatives are looked at as well.
In the third chapter I describe the attempt o f members of the migrant community 
to care for one another. This covers both the cultural cohesiveness found within the 
community and union activism. It also includes the concerted efforts made by 
ex-migrants, Chicanos and religious and secular activists.
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CHAPTER II
TH E MIGRANTS 
M IGRANT TRENDS
The history o f Mexican migration to the United States, and in particular to the 
Pacific Northwest, spans many generations. Although the decades following 1940 saw 
the greatest numbers of Hispanic migrants come through Oregon the earlier time period 
is necessary to cover briefly. Most of Oregon’s Hispanic migrant workers have labored 
on farms. Mexicans came to Oregon as early as the mid-nineteenth century as arrieros 
or muleteers led their animals into the mining camps of northern California and 
southern Oregon. Later, Mexicans joined other sheepherders, settling in eastern Oregon 
to tend some of the three million sheep grazing the plains. The presence o f the Mexican 
vaquero can also be found in Oregon during the 1800s (Slatta 1979, 155).
Aside from the above mentioned, most Mexican, and later, Latin American, 
migrants who ventured to Oregon did so as a result of economic hardship. When the 
Spanish invaded the area now known as Mexico, creating haciendas and a rigid caste 
system, the natives suffered. The 1913 Agrarian Revolution, led by intellectuals, had 
looked hopeful for the landless and the poor. Land was seized and redistributed, but in 
1918 Zapata was assassinated and survivors of the regime began to rebel. What 
proceeded was a bloody struggle between the powers that had previously existed -  the 
church, military, foreign capital, industrial powers, large rural landowners and those 
representing the agrarian movement. As fighting worsened, people left, some heading
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north, crossing over the border to find peace and avoid the economic disaster the war 
was bound to bring (Galarza 1964, 40). Little had changed. In the 1920s, for instance, 
in the state o f Jalisco, Mexico, 96.2% were landless farm families and in the state of 
Varacruz 98.9% were landless, working the land that had once been theirs. 
Simultaneously, an increased need for workers on the expanding cotton and vegetable 
farms further encouraged Mexicans to head for the Southwestern States. As the 
migration continued, the Mexican population of Texas increased from 71,062 to 683,681 
between 1900 and 1930. The surplus of labor forced some to pick beans and hops in 
Oregon while others worked on the railroad labor gangs which built the Northwest rails 
(Gutierrez 1983, C9).
Wages in the Southwest remained low throughout the twentieth century 
compared with the rest o f the United States, insuring the steady flow of Mexicans and 
Mexican-Americans to the north in search o f work steady (Wells 1976, 267). Some of 
those Mexicans, as well as Mexican-Americans who had always lived in what became the 
Southwestern U nited States, began to make it to the Northwest, becoming permanent 
residents (Gamboa 1984, 21).
The real thrust of migration of Hispanic workers to the Northwest began in the 
1940s. During the war effort farmers were bent on keeping wages low and conditions 
cheap. The farmers were willing to tiy anything before they would give into the 
demands o f domestic workers which included higher wages and better conditions 
(Gamboa 1984, 33). First Oregon farmers tried to organize a woman’s army to pick the 
crops, but it wasn’t enough. With the Anglo labor gone, the Japanese interned, and the 
farm ers’ fear o f union activity and labor unrest, Oregon farmers turned to the braceros, 
which the government had already begun to contract from Mexico and transport to
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California farmers. And though it was mainly the larger farms that used the braceros, 
most farmers liked the program because it kept wages, unionism, and, to some extent, 
labor unrest down (Gamboa 1984, 33; Robertson 1969, 5).
It was during this time that Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, began playing a 
significant role as agricultural laborers in Oregon. Some were Mexicans migrating over 
the border while others were Chicanos, citizens of the Southwest. Braceros were hired 
on mostly as pickers, with some being assigned work as handy men, irrigators, pruners, 
tractor drivers and sorters. Under the federal government act between 1943 and 1947, 
46,072 single men worked the fields in Oregon and were then sent home, a practice later 
expanded by the bracero program (Gamboa 1984, 99). Public Law 78, the bracero 
program, was enacted in 1951 as a two year program, but, with persistent pressure from 
the farm lobby, lasted until 1965. Under this program up to 1000 Mexicans worked 
annually in Oregon after 1947, mainly in the pear orchards o f the Rogue Valley (Bianco 
1963a, 15).
Most came from central Mexico, one o f the poorest, most rural regions in the 
country. They heard of the opportunity through word o f mouth, radio or ads, and then 
headed from their small towns or farms to the stadium in Mexico city, meeting up with 
thousands o f others like themselves. Few would ultimately pass the health exams, which 
included venereal disease, x-ray and serological tests. Those selected were then 
photographed, vaccinated for small pox, had the work contract explained to them, and 
were put on a train which, 4 to 6 weeks later, arrived in the Northwest (Gamboa 1984, 
154).
Once those few arrived, many experienced cultural shock. There was the new 
language; extremely hard work; cold weather worsened by inappropriate clothing;
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tasteless, non-Mexican food; lack o f culture; family and leisure activities; and, outside the 
camp, hostile reaction from local citizens (Gamboa 1984, 173).
When the government program ended Northwest farmers gave up the braceros 
because the government refused to continue covering the cost o f transporting them, an 
expense o f approximately $135 per bracero. Instead, farmers began to rely on 
Mexican-Americans from the Southwest, who they estimated were cheaper (Gamboa 
1984, 33). The largest numbers found their way from Texas, New Mexico and California 
through contractors or on their own. Industrial development after W orld W ar II and 
land consolidation reduced crops and agricultural jobs in southern Texas, while 
discrimination kept Chicanos from getting other kinds o f jobs. Futherm ore, the new 
absentee landlords in the Southwest left migrants without connections or the jobs they 
had once relied on, which forced them to search elsewhere (Wells 1976, 267).
Despite public opinion, almost all of these migrants were U.S. citizens. Between 
the end of the bracero program and the 1970s migrants came mostly from the Southwest. 
In the 1980s this would change as economic conditions in Mexico in the late seventies 
left many without a way to survive.
TH E MIGRANTS -  NUMBERS
For a variety o f reasons, estimates o f the number of migrants, and the 
percentage of Hispanics among them, working each season in Oregon have been sketchy. 
Statistics found in newspapers, government documents and private reports conflict. 
Incomplete records kept by farmers or contractors due to tax reasons and the migrants’ 
own fears of reporting their whereabouts to those they didn’t trust, especially if they 
were illegal aliens, remained problems in collecting accurate numbers. Government
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agencies conducting surveys experienced hostility from farmers, migrants and other 
government agencies, and, because o f understaffing, only performed random samplings. 
The results also varied depending on the time of the summer because migrants moved 
from place to place, causing them to be left out o f the count, o r counted twice.
The most complete numbers came from the Migrant H ealth Project, an Office of 
Equal Opportunity funded program, but it only covered certain counties and only lasted 
from 1963 to 1971. Using the most accurate statewide estimates from the Oregon 
D epartm ent o f Labor, the migrant population can be averaged at approximately 61,200 
between 1958 and 1968, dropping off continually thereafter. During the 1950s and 1960s 
the counties containing 90% of the migrants were Clackamas, H ood River, Jackson, 
Klamath, Linn, Malheur, Marion, Polk, Jefferson, Deschutes, Crook, Umatilla, 
Washington and Yamhill. Within those counties most of the migrants worked in the 
W illamette Valley, the far southeast corner of the state, and the Hood River region 
(Oregon Migrant Health Project 1970).
Several significant trends developed between 1950 and the present. Agricultural 
labor declined 50% in size, with each year’s numbers rising or falling according to the 
need and to the previous two years’ wage level and housing conditions. In the 1950s, 
almost all of the farmworkers, excluding the braceros, were U.S. citizens (Slatta 1979,
156; Smith 1966, 4). Later, Mexican-American and Mexican migrants increasingly 
replaced Anglo migrants. Between 1966 and 1970 Hispanic migrants rose from 28% to 
70% of all migrants in the Northwest (Slatta 1979,155). While some of the 
Spanish-speaking migrants became settled farm workers in Oregon over the years other 
migrants, mostly illegal Mexican workers, replaced them. By the 1980s only 12.8% o f the 
permanently settled Chicanos in Oregon still worked primarily in farm labor, with 6
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Oregon counties counting over 2,500 Hispanic perm anent residents (Slatta and Atkinson 
1984, 110).
After the 1970s many m ore migrants came from outside the country. Eighty-five 
to 90 percent were from Mexico, with a disproportionate number coming from Mixteca, 
Oxahaca, Mexico where poverty and unemployment was higher than other areas (Jack 
Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS O F THE M IGRANT
The stereotype of the Hispanic migrant farm worker does not fit many, although 
one generalization has proven to be true. Economic hardship caused many to turn to or 
continue in this line of work. Some, once small landowners, lost what they had during 
one o f the many bad economic times in Mexico or in another Latin American country. 
Others fled from political persecution, especially Central Americans after the 1970s.
Some wanted to add to what they may already have had in their hom e country. This 
desire may have been to afford more land, to start a small business, to educate their 
children o r to better support their extended family. Profiles o f workers were reported 
after some were able to come out of hiding when they acquired citizenship after the 1986 
Immigration and Reform Control Act. Enrique and Graciela Sanchez from Tomaltlan, 
Mexico, for instance, had previously owned a tortilla factory and a home and were 
wealthy enough to hire help. When the economy turned bad in 1979 they were forced to 
sell their home and resorted to paying $1,900 to a "coyote" hired to smuggle them across 
the border. They and their four children lived in a trailer, working the fields o f Oregon 
(Cowen 1987b, D l).
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Indeed a state o f economic desperation plagued most migrants. In 1987 it was 
estim ated that 50% of all Mexicans in Mexico were underemployed or unemployed while 
50% lived without electricity or running water (Cowen 1987b, D l).
Regardless of their previous state, as migrants they were forced to lead a 
different life, travelling from place to place, wherever needed, squatting, stooping or 
reaching on ladders, most likely with wife and child straining beside them 10 to 12 hours 
a day, six days a week. In the course o f a year they might travel "as many as three to 
five thousand or more miles, working from six to a dozen crops" (Loprinzi 1947, 10).
Some conditions and trends have changed since the 1940s. In the 1950s and 
1960s most Spanish-speaking migrants were either unmarried o r without their families. 
While most arrived on their own as many had before them, some were recruited to the 
Northwest by the government (Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 4).
Their trip to the north was grueling. They rode in old cars which often broke 
down, leaving them stranded. Many struggled to adapt to the unfamiliar cold weather, 
even as they rode in the back of a truck in clothes useful only in a warm Southwest.
They encountered hostile aggression from local citizens as they passed through small 
rural communities (Gamboa 1984, 294). Often under contract with a crew leader or 
contractor, who usually had an unwritten agreement with a certain number o f farms, the 
workers were loaned travel money at high interest rates or brought in cars or trucks by 
the contractor and assured o f housing in a major camp. Once in Oregon, their 
contractor established credit with banks, stores and taverns, to be paid back with interest 
to both the contractor and the business providing services (Infante and Current 1958,
C2; Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 11).
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In the 1960s as farmers’ associations took over the recruitment, m ore and more 
Spanish-speaking families arrived during the February to October harvest season, usually 
without funds and having no connections with a crew leader, contractor o r workplace, 
remaining sometimes days or weeks. These families often failed to find steady work, 
even during the busiest part of the season. They struggled to find those who would sell 
them items on credit, relying on relatives to loan small sums of money, or, if  absolutely 
necessary, on aid from religious, volunteer or government agencies where it could be 
found (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1964/65).
Single young men and children continue to be a dominant group in the fields of 
Oregon. One study in the late 1950s documented that 50% o f the children over the age 
of eight worked, and reports in the Oregonian regularly cited children not going to 
summer school because they were needed in the fields. One reporter quoted a worker 
as saying, "If the children don’t work you cain’t [sic] hardly make it" (Payne 1959). In 
1971 an American Friends Service Committee report on child labor, surveying Oregon, 
Washington, Ohio, Maine and California concluded that 25% of all farm workers in the 
U.S. were under 16 years old (Berman and Aiches 1971, 1). In the 1980s young men 
and whole families continued to work the fields. One 15 year old said he migrated each 
year. He had worked in Los Angeles as a busboy, repaired cars for people referred by 
friends in Oregon and worked the fields o f Oregon (Olmos 1983a, MWD2). Again in 
1989 it was estimated that 25% of all migrant labor in the nation was still under the age 
of 16 (Frontline 1990).
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The conditions the migrants encountered were symbolic o f the overall attitude 
towards migrants that prevailed among farmers, local residents and government 
representatives throughout the entire time period from the 1940s to 1990. Though there 
was little intent to harm the farmworkers, there was also far too little intent to help 
them. The migrants were seen as transient and therefore temporary, and thus money 
was often not appropiated for their care. Another impression many had reinforced this 
lack of action. Some believed that the migrants were used to, and therefore satisfied 
with, the horrid conditions.
Migrant Wages
The extremely low wages that the farm workers endured can be traced to the lack 
of political protection awarded other workers in the United States. This lack of 
protection dates back to the loss of power experienced by domestic farm workers at the 
turn o f the century. The loss o f power was preceded by the strides industrialists and 
large farmowners made during and after the Gilded Age (Feise 1978, 79). Bankrupted 
farmers of this earlier time joined other migrants as farmworkers or urban industrial 
workers, and with their political and eonomic power stripped in Congress, they watched 
the legislative scales slant to protect large landowners’ interests in direct opposition to 
their needs. While urban industrial interests became stronger in their representation in 
the government, rural concerns, especially landless migrants, were silenced. The rural 
problems resolved often involved the large landowners (Milk 1972). The belief that 
migrants o f this time were only temporary and would fulfil the American Dream some 
day reinforced the justification not to aid them (Gamboa 1984, 333). These farmworkers
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were incapable o f establishing any law like the National Labor Relations Act to protect 
them. Nor were they able to direct the agricultural research which worsened the 
migrants’ plight and was funded by the government.
Because o f the use o f the machinery, often invented through this agricultural 
research, the number o f all agricultural workers, many of whom were migrants, declined. 
The num ber o f agricultural workers fell nationally from 3 million to 1.5 million between 
1919 and 1967, dropping from 35% to 3% of the American population between 1910 and 
1976. Later, with the use o f foreign labor, farmworkers became an even more invisible 
and vulnerable group (Feise 1978, 76).
While in 1966 the national annual agricultural wage earnings stood at $1,240, or 
$935 if doing only farm work, in 1989 the average migrant family earned $8,000 a year 
compared to $24,000 for the average American family in all other areas o f work 
(Frontline 1990; Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 115; Statistical Abstract o f the United States 
1990, 451).
The D epartm ent o f Agriculture’s job was to establish fair annual wage rates. 
These rates did not, however, maintain a fair wage because the seasonal crop production 
and the going rate of sale often convinced farmers and contractors to quietly pay the 
rate they chose. Meanwhile, the quoted wage rates put out by the regional Farm 
Bureaus were often higher than the actual wage rates because they were given by the 
farmers, who wanted to convince teenagers o r the urban unemployed to pick. These 
wages were based on fast, professional pickers working full-time. For example, in 1965 
the Oregonian sent a college-aged reporter out to pick, checking the hourly rate. He 
wrote, "In some cases growers have claimed earnings between $1.25 and $2.00 an hour 
for an experienced teenage worker." This reporter worked ten hours in a "good field"
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and made $8.50, equalling $.85 an hour. Another staff writer sent his oldest son out who 
made $1.75 all day (Oregonian June 27, 1965, 31).
Wages fluctuated slightly from region to region and from season to season, and, 
unless a complaint was filed, wage payments were rarely checked by the government 
inspectors (Gamboa 1984, 300). The Oregon Bureau o f Labor and Industries was 
responsible for monitoring compliance o f the minimum wage law but had "so far not 
extended the audits to agricultural employers" (Martinis 1990, DIO). In 1990 the 
minimum wage required was $4.20, but a study by the local union of Northwest 
Treeplanters and Farmworkers United found that in 1989 farmworkers were underpaid 
by two million dollars (McCarthy 1990b, B l). The union announced to a Oregon Senate 
panel that all 18 o f the strawberry fields it monitored in its study had broken the 
minimum wage law (Martinis 1990, DIO).
When the migrants had been promised otherwise, or if they didn’t like the rate, 
there was very little they could do that year, owing on credit, trapped without funds, 
away from their homes and lacking the knowledge from whom to seek help. There were 
indications that the number of migrants would decline for the next two years when they 
had been exceptionally mistreated or tricked in a particular county or region, but, by and 
large, the migrants were often forced to accept the conditions they found for that year 
(Infante and Current 1959, 40; Stein 1990, LI).
Once this low wage was paid, and credit and interest for travel, housing and food 
costs returned to stores and contractors very little was left. It was estimated that 75% of 
the migrants’ income was spent in the region he worked in and that 22% of the 
businesses in the area increased sales by the migrant spending (Oregon Migrant Health 
Project 1969, 10). Obviously, it was nearly impossible to save any money.
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When the season ended in mid-October many returned home, most to  the 
Southwest, with little, if any, money in hand, to family, friends, or winter work. During 
the winter time, whether they remained in Oregon or returned home, finding work 
proved difficult. If they did find work it might be farm work, odd jobs, part-time factory 
or mill work, auto repair, construction, babysitting, house cleaning, wood chopping or 
seamstress work (Bianco 1983; McDermott 1990; Oregon State Bureau o f Labor 1959).
Housing
During the bracero program most housing was run by the government. Because 
it was considered to be temporary very little money was invested in it. The tents used 
were the bare minimum in quality. Developed by the former engineer of the Barnum 
and Bailey circus, they were made to be put up and taken down quickly, and to sleep up 
to 800 men. The men, accustomed to warm weather, never got used to the one wool 
blanket and woodburning space heaters provided for the cold and rainy spring nights. 
After the first few years the light-weight tents provided in these "farm labor supply 
centers," as the government called them, gave no respite from the wind, dust, bugs, rain 
or burning sun. The food, as well, was poor. So inadequate, in fact, that riots and 
strikes broke out regularly among the braceros (Gamboa 1973, 60, 147). As well, the 
chemicals used to sterilize the camps were poisonous, applied frequently and used 
without well-known necessary precautions. Open privies and garbage pits joined 
above-ground waste water to make a perfect breeding ground for disease (Gamboa 1984, 
147).
After the bracero program, housing improved, but this proved to be only 
temporary, lasting just a decade. For this first decade after the bracero program ended, 
85% of the housing for Mexican-American workers was located on the private farms
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where they worked, allowing migrants the opportunity to plant gardens and live less 
restrictive lives.
Later, farmers became more paternalistic and controlling and thought o f cheaper 
ways o f housing the migrants, hiring contractors and builders o f camps who used the 
issue o f control as a main sales incentive. The first step was acquiring the government 
camps. No one foresaw the future better than the Secretary Treasurer o f the 
International Longshoreman’s and W arehousemen’s Union when he said in 1947, 
"Turning these camps over to the growers is equivalent to a jail sentence against farm 
workers" (Gamboa 1984, 246). After the war farmers did purchase the old government 
camps. They often raised the rent without maintaining the upkeep, as the Yamhill 
County Farm Labor Association did in 1948 when it doubled the rent immediately after 
acquiring a camp (Gamboa 1984, 333). This new housing was designed for multiple use 
such as off-season garages or easy-access storage (Gamboa 1973, 63). Old converted and 
unconverted bams were also used (Lopez 1976, 3; Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 
20).
After the 1960s more families, instead o f lone men, arrived to work the fields.
But the old camps were still set up for single men staying only a short while. Bunkbeds 
lined the walls o f the little rooms, units were not insulated for winter, and toilets and 
washrooms remained located outside the cabins (Stein 1990, LI).
An informal interview of migrants and a 1969 government study found that good 
housing conditions were a primary factor in obtaining and maintaining a stable labor 
force, with migrants queried stating that good housing was second only to fair treatm ent 
by the grower and was a deciding factor in their choice o f work (Oregon Migrant Health 
Project 1969, 25; Smith 1966, 4). One government study in 1962 stated, "the visits to the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
18
migrant camps in the valley revealed that migrants prefer paying rent, and even board if 
the camps are tolerable" (Bianco 1962a, 16). A nother found that "the cam p visits 
showed that the migrant worked on farms where suitable housing existed. Also, the 
quality o f worker was commensurated with the quality of housing available" (Bianco 
1962b, 27). Regardless, conditions rarely climbed above a very low standard.
Several major studies o f labor camps and housing were conducted: the 1958 
Bureau of Labor study, and the 1962, 1966 and 1969 Governor’s Report, conducted by 
the Oregon State University Extension Service, the OSPIRG study in 1978 and a 1990 
study by the Commission on Agricultural Workers. What the studies found were 
atrocious conditions for expensive rates that were up to an estimated 50% o f the 
migrants’ wages (Infante and Current 1958, 20; McCarthy 1990a, B l). In 1958, 62.5% 
lived with their family in a one room dwelling with no plumbing, heating, cooking 
utilities or refrigeration. In the 1968 inspection o f the camps in Clackamas County, 88% 
had no running water in sinks and 89% had no refrigeration (Oregon Migrant Health 
Project 1968, 25). Some lived in barns holding large numbers o f men, and in other 
camps open sewers flowed past housing or into swimming holes (Bianco 1962c, 23). 
Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions caused one report to find that "odors from at 
least one o f the camps could be smelled 100 feet from the nearest shack" (Lattie 1962,
1). There were always a few farmers who would make improvements in the hopes of 
acquiring the best workers, but for the most part things remained so bad that in 1970 
one Bureau o f Labor official announced, "there are places being used right now you 
wouldn’t put a dog in" (Smith 1966, 4).
In 1968 the Labor Program Chief of the Oregon State Board of Health, Taylor 
Sandvigen, said that 10% of the state’s migrant housing should have been abolished
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immediately, and chances were that the number in that bad a state o f disrepair was far 
higher, based on the lack of inspections done annually (Olmos 1968a, 17). O f the 
majority o f camps, which regularly did pass inspections, Father David Zegar o f Cornelius 
said, "most camps pass inspections . . .  so obviously the standards are low" (Butterworth 
1991, C l). As will be discussed below, even when inspections occurred, rechecking the 
farms even once to ensure corrections were made was nearly impossible with the small 
staff and funding the state departments received for this duty. One account describes 
this problem:
Tito Aguilar lives in a camp. . . .  Officially the camp was
closed because it did not meet state health regulations.
Most o f the cabin doors have been nailed shut. But when 
Tito and his wife arrived they said the labor contractor 
who leases the camp simply pulled the nails out o f the 
door and let them move in on the condition they work for 
him (Oregonian, 7 July 1972, 24).
The M igrant Health Project’s survey of corrections m ade in the years it functioned never
found more than 40% of the corrections made in any o f the regions they worked in for
any o f the following conditions: camp area, water supply, sewage disposal, living units,
lavatory and laundry or garbage disposal (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1964-71). In
1976 the OSPIRG report concluded, "camp conditions often do not m eet the state health
and safety standards, and that energetic enforcement o f the law by OHS is needed to
bring the camps into compliance" (Lopez 1976, 25). In 1990 the Commission on
Agricultural W orkers found that Oregon housing for the migrants was worse than
California’s or W ashington’s (Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
M ore recently other factors have worsened the availability o f quality housing.
A fter the enactment o f IRCA illegals could not use federally funded housing and what 
they could find they could not complain about (McCarthy 1990a, B l). With sources
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finding that between 60 to 75 percent of the migrants were undocumented, this was 
cause for alarm. "The illegal migrants are sleeping in cars or camping out. . . .  A  two 
bedroom house in the Polk County town o f Independence is home for 52 migrants" 
(McCarthy 1990b, B l). Another account found "about 20 . . .  workers living in parked 
cars in and around the large berry fields where others sleep on thin sheets o f wood" 
(Chan 1990, CIO). Also, in some regions of Oregon increased population allowed 
landlords to raise the rent.
Field conditions were no better, typically having few facilities for the workers. A 
study of another 100 Hispanic migrants in Oregon conducted in 1987 found 96% 
disliking the living conditions, but fearing repercusions which kept them from 
complaining (Cowen 1987a, A l). In one field only three broken-down toilets were 
available for over 300 workers (Lopez 1976, 8). In a study done in 1984 all 100 migrants 
said they had never been provided with hand washbasins, required by state law, and that 
drinking supplies usually meant one cup in a bucket o f water to be shared by all 
employees. Only one of the 100 had ever seen toilet paper in the field, also required by 
law (Hogan 1984, B l).
The problem of housing and field conditions was constantly brought up by 
religious activists, health workers and a few adamant government officials. Farmers 
claimed that they were unable to afford improvements or keep the farms up to state 
standards, especially since they only used the labor for a short time each year. At the 
same time, however, they seemed to find the money to invest in expensive pieces of 
machinery which they used each year for an even shorter time. This method of farm 
improvement which funded mechanization instead o f providing more efficient and
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humane labor policies was regularly reinforced by banks who willingly loaned money for 
capital improvements (Hightower 1973; Milk 1972; Young and Newton 1980).
Many local residents were unaware o f the migrants’ predicament. Those who 
were often found it appalling. Some blamed the migrants themselves for creating the 
disgusting conditions while others, though concerned, felt that their communities should 
bear the brunt. It can be assumed that like Forest Grove’s and W oodburn’s citizens, 
local residents throughout Oregon rejected proposals, fearing increased numbers of 
migrants, the burden o f becoming the hub for services and reduced land values (Joanne 
Jessel, personal interview, 10 August 1990). The resistance felt in small communities 
proved to be detrimental to change. In response, the 1989 state legislature passed a law 
which made it illegal for communities to create zoning laws to protect their areas from 
migrant housing. But this has not stopped residents from voting down levies required to 
fund such projects (Butterworth 1991, C l).
Few communities, on the other hand, found it more productive to solve the influx 
of migrants by providing permanant housing so that they did not have to spend annual 
local resources for housing or food, and other costs of supporting an unemployed group 
who often ended up under bridges, on streets and in fields before or at the end of the 
season. These few towns took matters into their own hands, building housing projects to 
settle the migrants. In 1982 Forest Grove constructed a 50 unit project and attem pted 
to raise another, but the citizens voted it down (Stewart 1982, MW7).
Health
The health hazards o f migrant labor made it one o f the most dangerous 
occupations. Constant travel, poverty wages, stoop labor and exposure to cold and hot 
weather created troubling effects. Pesticides, herbicides and insecticides caused health
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problems. The diet o f the migrant was also inadequate. The migrants' diet was related 
to their labor. The wages kept their consumption low. And the camp conditions and 
work hours reduced their ability to cook nutritious meals.
When the government camps existed for the braceros, and similarly when the 
farmers took these over, food provided for the workers was in inadequate quantities and 
often spoiled, causing food poisoning, because o f the m ethods and procedures the 
government and farmers employed. Preparation was hours early and the unrefrigerated 
food was set out in the sun-drenched field for up to eight hours (Gamboa 1984, 147; 
Oregon Migrant Health Project 1964-71).
At a Grants Pass hop ranch in 1943, 500 o f the 511 workers got food poisoning 
(Gamboa 1984, 147). In 1945 it became such a serious problem that the Mexican 
embassy requested that Northwest labor camps improve the food quality and quantity or 
Mexico would consider cancelling its contract (Gamboa 1984, 148).
In 1947, when the feeding of the braceros was abandoned by the government and 
taken over by the farm association, things worsened. The private profit incentive caused 
a reduction in the quality and quantity of the food. Recently, with the food buying and 
preparation left to each family, the problem has taken another direction. Many camps 
did not provide refrigeration, stove or cooking utensils. The migrating family relied on a 
small portable stove and bought their food daily or used non-perishable food. Most of 
the protein foods were given up. As well, fresh food was hard to come by. The camp 
was far away from major markets and the workday too long and hard to have the time to 
drive the distance daily. Even when they did have the fresh food many were so 
exhausted after a 10 or more hour day that veiy little cooking occurred.
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Infant mortality remained 125% higher for farmworkers than for other 
Americans (Kirchmeier 1980, B3). For those who did survive, the effects o f migrant 
work and life were also devastating. The diet o f both the adults and the children stayed 
far below the recommended daily requirement (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 29). 
A study o f  60 children conducted by the State Board o f  Health in 1970 at the 
Independence Migrant Summer School found 38% low in vitamin A, 36% below normal 
height, 14.5% below normal weight, 17% low in vitamin C and 75% below the R D A  in 
vitamin intake as a whole (<Oregonian, 18 February 1970,11). In a study conducted by El 
Centro Cultural in 1984, 50% of the migrants, compared to 20% of Americans, failed 
eye exams (Cargill 1984, B l).
Although migrants were far more afflicted by health problems than the average 
American, migrants didn’t receive dental and medical benefits, and even when there 
were services available the cost and distance kept migrants from using them. Health 
worker Rebecca Hart found that "‘many said they don’t have the money for a doctor or 
can’t go unless they have someone to translate for them ’" (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1). One 
study found that farmworkers had 1.6 times more muscular problems from the stoop 
labor than the average American worker. Migrants were also very likely to be affected 
by herbicides, insecticides and chemical fertilizer use in the fields, which may cause birth 
defects, cancer and tuberculosis (Frisvold 1988, 876; Lopez 1976, 23). Migrants faced a 
300% higher chance of dying from an on-the-job accident than the average American 
worker (Kirchmeier 1980, B3). Camp conditions led to a high rate o f hepatitis, 
parasites, respiratory and gastrointestinal problems. Communicable diseases afflicted the 
workers because of inadequate and unclean facilities (Frisvold 1988, 877). Prostitution 
in the camps was rampant, with trucks of girls brought out to do business; therefore
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venereal and other sexual diseases spread (Lopez 1976, 10; Oregon Migrant Health Project 
1969, 30). The consequences were disasterous. University of Portland Professor and 
researcher Joseph Gallegos stressed, "ask a farmworker who has been exposed to 
pesticides all his life what is elderly and you’re likely to get an answer o f 45 years o f age" 
(Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
EDUCATION
Hispanic migrants’ access to education never equalled that of other Americans. 
This in part was caused by a combination of things. The migrants’ culture and language 
caused them to be at a disadvantage. But, more so, their work conditions made it nearly 
impossible for them to take advantage of any opportunities offered them. The 
government lacked consistent effort in setting up programs which could have alleviated 
the migrants’ loss.
At the same time, when success was found it was through the help o f these 
programs, which were often demanded by local or state activists. But, the largest factor 
for student progress was the motivated parents who wanted their children to have the 
chance to climb out o f the cycle o f migration and poverty.
For both those who returned home and those who remained in Oregon, 
educating their children proved hard. When migrants did send their children to school, 
they encountered a two-edged sword. On the one hand they too may have believed in 
the American dream, supposedly realized through education. But those who sent their 
children lost their addition to the family income and ran the risk of their children losing 
their culture. They surely feared exposing them to the harsh world of unfriendly Anglos. 
Twice as many migrants as settled Hispanics surveyed in Yakima had difficulty
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understanding the teacher, while 58% of the migrant students worried about the clothes 
they had to wear, and the poverty and cultural isolation their clothing showed (Gecas 
1980, 591). As the majority o f school administrators in one study found, this feeling of 
awkwardness led migrant children not to more disruptive behavior but rather to 
withdraw. Add to that the adjustment to each new school, unprepared for the special 
needs o f the migrant student, and failure frequently met them just around the corner. 
Although many Hispanics persisted in sending their children to school, both those who 
continue to migrate and those who have settled, have found academic advancement 
difficult and far too rare.
For those who migrated, the average school attendence for their children 
remained low. The harvest season cut into both the beginning and the end of the school 
year, forcing the children to either miss several months or change schools frequently. 
Those who attended were expected to learn and succeed in an unfamiliar language. The 
children lost two to three weeks each time they moved, equalling 20 to 30 weeks a year.
In one study o f Yakima migrants and settled Hispanics, twice as many high school aged 
migrants, compared to the settled, missed school "often" (Gecas 1980, 590).
The Yakima study mentioned earlier found that both migrant and settled parents 
were very supportive and encouraging o f their children’s education and career 
advancement, and that instead of cultural barriers, economic barriers in large part 
caused the failure rate. The study was conducted in three towns with a population of 
approximately 5,000, similiar to the size o f the Oregon towns o f Woodburn, Gervais and 
Nyssa where many Hispanics reside as well. The study found that the aspirations o f the 
children were high with many of their expectations of success stemming from the strong
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encouragement their parents gave them. Christina Gomez, migrant and m other o f four, 
explained her efforts:
They have a good education. I like them to do everything 
right. We talk before they go to bed. I tell them I want to 
hear from their teachers that they work hard. I push them 
to study so when they are bigger they will get a good job, 
not lead the same lives as their parents (M cDermott 1990,
K l).
As migrant students arrived at the teen years, their expectations dropped 
dramatically, because they became more realistic about their possibilities and limitations: 
"This represents a gap between desire and perceived reality, a reality which appears 
more grim as the child grows older" (Gecas 1980, 592). At least for the first generation 
of the settled, the alienation o f the child, the cultural misunderstanding between the 
teacher and the children and the discrimination did not completely disappear because 
the family was settled.
The educational programs set up for migrants did little to help. The programs
were conducted during the worst time of year for them -  the summer -  and thus they
could not take advantage of them. Teachers had to be extremely determ ined and
committed to get the young children to come, as the following account makes clear. At
4 A.M. the teachers had to help dress and load the young children on the bus which they
would drive out to the different camps.
But the all-important thing is that you be there to get the 
children before their parents leave for the fields early in 
the morning . . . otherwise, the family takes all the kids, 
and those not old enough to pick a berry sit in the car all 
day (Guernsey 1969, 1).
A  17-year-old from Texas who attended the 1980 Hillsboro summer school 
described the difficulties and the commitment needed: "‘I start picking at 4 a.m. I pick 
until 4 p.m. I go home, shower, catch bus. Class starts at 6 p.m. and lasts until 8:50
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p.m. Then I go home to be ready to pick again at 4 a.m.’" (Leeson 1983, B l). And, in 
their quest to learn English they found summer school classes extremely overcrowded, 
further reducing their chances o f learning.
Although the settled fared better, many o f those also had very low success rates. 
Those who had settled out still had more familial responsibilities than the Anglo 
students, losing the ability to participate in after-school activities o r have time for 
studies. Very few role models were available for these Hispanic students with few 
Hispanics teaching in Oregon (Hinkley and Olmos 1983, B7). In 1970, 45% of the 
Hispanic adults settled in Oregon compared to 24% Anglos still hadn’t finished high 
school (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 110). By the 1980s, little had changed for the 
majority, with the dropout rate remaining at 43% for settled Hispanics in Oregon 
(Hinkley and Olmos 1983, B7; Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 111). Another study done on 
Hispanic adults over the age o f 50 in Oregon found that 82% o f them had completed 
less than six years o f education (Fitzgibbon 1991, MP1).
Other problems compounded the school experience. Discrimination has 
remained a factor. Although most educators have moved beyond stereotypes and 
slanted perspectives, this attitude allowed one state school superintendent to  claim in 
1960 that the migrants were "educationally retarded." This and other destructive 
perceptions have remained alive (Wentworth 1960, 3). Chicano students felt the tension 
over race. Many very isolated in Oregon schools, unlike in their Texas hometowns, 
which were often largely Hispanic. Their needed to affiliate with the few other Hispanic 
students in their high school in Oregon helped the isolation but further alienated them 
from the Anglos. In Forest Grove Hispanic students finally vented their frustration and 
anger with violence (Hinkley and Olmos 1983, B7).
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In the 1940s farmers contracted farmworkers from Mexico to work in Oregon 
with the specific intent o f returning the workers at the end of each season. After the 
bracero program, Hispanics from the Southwest joined Mexicans in migrating. Although 
most returned home there were always a few who stayed on, settling in Oregon because 
o f the better wages, job opportunities or familial ties. By the 1960s several rural 
Hispanic communities had developed throughout Oregon, providing impetus and support 
for other migrants would would attempt to make the transition o f settling in Oregon. 
Living in these communities were those who would later push for better conditions for 
the migrants and Oregon Hispanics in general.
Many migrants lacked formal education, a firm knowledge of the English 
language, connections necessary to make a job change or seek help, or many savings. 
They suffered from low wages and had large families. Their reliance on their own 
culture and family network and their preference to remain in small towns, or return to 
their hometowns after the season ended, further removed them from the outside world, 
and from other lines o f work, located in urban areas (LaGra 1969; Slatta 1979; Stream 
1976; Wells 1976). All of these reasons discouraged migrants from staying in Oregon 
and from acquiring different work.
Though the effort required to settle out remained overwhelming, many migrants 
did attempt to move into urbanized areas or small towns to find alternate work. 
Mechanization encouraged this trend since jobs became scarcer. This was an easier 
transition for those who saw work in the fields as supplemental income (Bianco 1963, 14; 
Cowen 1984, C2). At the same time, increasing numbers o f South American refugees 
and illegals, and the continuing economic decline in the Southwest and elsewhere, often
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squeezed Mexican-Americans out o f farm labor because of even cheaper wages (Wells 
1976, 268).
Im portant studies of settled ex-migrants in Washington and Wisconsin provide 
information on the environment needed to encourage migrants to  settle out. In 
Wisconsin, Wells found that if a migrant family regularly visited friends o r relatives who 
settled out, then they had a higher likelihood of attempting it themselves, because o f the 
familiarity and connections they gained. On the other hand familial ties also 
discouraged migrants from settling out, especially if as a family economic unit they had 
been successful. The loss o f the earnings o f the family member o r family who left the 
migrant stream often meant suffering for the rest of the unit (Wells 1976, 269).
In the 1970 Federal Census o f Oregon 66% of the settled Hispanics were urban, 
30% rural, with 12.8% still working on farms (Slatta 1979, 156). And by the 1980s Slatta 
would contend that, "the migrant worker image, . . . though still valid for a minority, is 
inappropiate for nine-tenths of all Chicanos" (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 108). But, many 
o f these Hispanics, although settled, still continued to resort to migratory labor, even if 
minimally. A 1973 study of migrants and settled Hispanics in Washington found that 
63% of the settled ex-migrants still did some fieldwork. Those in urban areas at times 
joined others in the fields in order to make extra money. In this case the settled 
Hispanic migrants averaged only $3,830 per family compared to $2,760 for those who 
continued to migrate year-round (Gecas 1973, 590).
The impact on small urban areas in Oregon has been dramatic. In the 1980s 
seven counties had over 2,500 Chicanos, with the Oregon cities o f Nyssa, Woodburn, 
Ontario and Independence leading the way with 40.2%, 18.2%, 13.6% and 17.1%
Hispanic populations (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 115). During harvest time these and
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other small towns bulged with up to three times more Hispanics, who might some day 
settle as well. Woodburn, for example, increased its Hispanic population o f 5,000 
year-round to 15,000 during each the summer (Oregonian 1 December 1983, FI).
For many of these migrants who settled out, poverty persisted. Since the 1970s 
the family income of Hispanics in Oregon declined. The settled made only a little bit 
more than the migrant, with many still working in the agricultural sector as a perm anent 
or part-time employees. In 1984 21% of those Hispanics settled in Oregon still worked 
below the poverty line, with 26.4%, compared to 18.6% Anglos, making under $10,000 
per year. Another factor hindered the income and savings o f Hispanics. Hispanics in 
Oregon continued to have larger families then Anglos, in part because o f their strong 
faith in Catholicism and the machismo value, which stresses that the "man’s worth is 
measured in part by his ability to father children" (Slatta 1979, 160).
While the disadvantages and risks of settling out were great, some studies found 
among the settled a slight increase in the education of the parents, a trend towards 
smaller families, a knowledge of the use of farm equipment o r job skills and a slightly 
higher income (Gecas 1973; Lagra 1969; Slatta 1979). Some settled workers found 
economic stability. A  total o f 28.3% of the Hispanic families in Oregon made between 
$20,000 and $34,900, compared to 35.5% of the Anglo families (Slatta 1979, 160).




While not all Oregonians treated Hispanic migrants unfairly, historically the 
reaction o f many was negative. That response ranged from insensitivity to rejection. 
Many Oregonians surely preferred a quiet coexistence, but some vocally and physically 
insisted on keeping Hispanics out of their communities and counties once the season 
ended. Unfortunately this attitude and action has persisted to the present time.
One of the most important factors in the fair treatm ent and success of the 
migrants was the level of discrimination and intolerance Oregonians displayed. 
Oregonians’ history of tolerance has not been strong. Unfortunately, Blacks, Chinese, 
Hispanics and other minorities have long been discouraged from settling in Oregon. 
During W orld W ar II it was seen as patriotic to hate and mistreat the Japanese 
(Gamboa 1984, 22). Later this attitude was extended to the Mexican braceros and 
Mexican-American migrants. Although the Japanese and Black workers were generally 
denied work because Anglo workers often refused to stay in the same camps with them, 
the farmers of the Northwest accepted braceros because they were cheaper and available 
(Gamboa 1984, 3, 22). Although most farmers wholeheartedly felt that the hiring of 
braceros was so good because they would help cut off an agricultural movement and keep 
wages down, it was easy for the farmers to justify their use by a stereotype stated by one 
farmer during the 1950s -- that Mexicans were biologically built to be "more adaptable to
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
32
squat labor" (Infante and Current 1958,12). The attitude the farmers held about the 
braceros' worth was reflected in the inhumane way in which they cared for them, in the 
food and housing, in the horrid work conditions and in the purposeful attem pt to send 
them back annually and to keep a new set coming rather than providing a smaller 
number with year round employment in Oregon.
The braceros and Mexican-Americans, along with other non-Anglos, were banned 
from pool halls, movie theaters, beer halls and liquor stores. H ealth authorities’ refusal 
to treat the braceros was so widespread that the Office o f Labor took up the issue in 
Washington D.C. An official letter was sent to the health departm ent in Oregon, but 
this request did not quell the discrimination. Regardless of whether it was the braceros 
themselves they distrusted or their supposed inability to pay for medical fees, the health 
authorities’ attitude was blatantly degrading (Gamboa 1984, 173, 181).
Most people wanted nothing to do with the braceros, and to keep them from 
visiting their towns, some banned the sale o f liquor on Sunday, specifically because the 
braceros would come in on that day (Gamboa 1984, 173; Slatta 1979, 160). Similar to the 
harassment other minorities received in Oregon, violence was aimed at the Mexicans.
One account tells of the seriousness o f this: In Klamath Falls one bracero was attacked 
without provocation, and as he staggered away after the brutal beating he, not his 
aggressors, was falsely arrested for drunkenness (Gamboa 1984, 171). Things got so 
harsh and disillusionment ran so high during the bracero program that by 1945 desertion 
of the camps by the braceros became a noticeable problem. It was estimated that five 
percent fled the camps and hid in the Chicano community. Others feigned illness or 
declared a family emergency in order to be returned home early (Gamboa 1984, 157).
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Most of the farmers or rural residents never got to know the Hispanic culture 
and "probably less even cared." While some of the braceros enrolled in English classes 
when they were offered, the farmers made no effort to learn Spanish. And after the war 
farmers were as "unprepared to relate to the bracero on a personal level as they were 
unable to house them adequately" (Gamboa 1984,157). The five percent defection rate, 
when braceros hid in the settled Hispanic community, must be seen as a response to the 
often brutal and humiliating conditions (Gamboa 1984, 157).
Cultural misunderstanding, ethnocentricity and stereotyping persisted. While the 
system of power and politics continued to underrepresent the Hispanic and other 
minorities, many Americans scapegoated them for problems of which they were merely 
victims. In Woodburn and Nyssa the school board and city council consistently lacked 
representation o f Hispanics, with only one Hispanic sitting on the city council in 
Woodburn and none on either the school board or the city council in Nyssa as o f 1985 
(Martinis 1987, DIO; Ulrich 1984, C l). Racial tension, police brutality and violence 
continue in the small Oregon communities where many Hispanics live (Blackmun 1990; 
Browning 1990; Cockle 1990).
Anglo communities tended towards ethnocentricity, feeling intimidated at being 
outnumbered or having different cultures surround them (Butterworth 1991, C l). 
Agitation among the Anglos rose during the summers when more migrants arrived. This 
was accentuated by the Anglo communities’ lack of awareness o f Hispanic culture. Just 
as once they were termed educationally retarded by school systems in Oregon, Spanish 
speakers were assumed to be uneducated, ignorant, un-American or illegal (Cargill 1984; 
Coonrod 1985; Cowen 1987; Durbin 1981; Hilderbrand 1983).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
34
Another example o f this cultural insensitivity and misunderstanding can be seen 
in Woodburn. Although Salud Medical Center desired to help Anglo and Russian senior 
citizens they found that these people would not come to the clinic because o f the 
Mexican men who congregated in the parking lot. They did not understand that these 
men were not out to intimidate, but just desired to  gather as they would in a traditional 
plaza in Latin America (Martinis 1987; DIO).
Although the signs declaring "No Mexicans, Blacks or Dogs" no longer hang in
windows and on doors, stereotypes continued. Many believe that the Mexicans were all
on welfare, received government benefits but didn’t pay taxes, and were lazy, alcoholic,
violent and not to be trusted. Their dirt-laden clothes were seen not as a condition of
their work, campsite or poverty, but instead as carelessness (McCarthy 1990, B l). This
was the obvious misconception when one school administrator and an Oregonian reporter
early in 1960 described migrant students,
As for cleanliness, some children when they took their first 
shower at school required four scrubbings. . . . They 
hadn’t known what keeping clean was all about. But once 
they caught on . . .  they got to like cleanliness. The idea 
snowballed, and some of their new interest in hygiene even 
rubbed off on their parents (W entworth 1960, 3).
Though the attitudes seemed harmless, in actuality the repercussions were 
disasterous. Because an accent was equated with a lack o f education or because all 
Hispanics were seen as illegals by some Anglos, they often did not get hired outside of 
agriculture (Ota 1983, A l).
This lack o f hiring also occurred because o f the fear by many that the Mexicans 
were the ones who took jobs away from Americans. This ignored the fact that many 
Hispanics were Americans and that the jobs they took often offered less than minimum 
wages.
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Instead o f blaming a whole network, Americans pointed the finger at the victim. 
If  migrants and other Hispanics were taking jobs it was because the economic and 
political system allowed and encouraged it. Employers were allowed to pay low wages 
and encouraged by the government to obtain foreign labor through government-funded 
programs. The government also systematically m aintained lax border patrols and did 
little to prevent the use o f illegal aliens. Chicano activists claimed that these Americans 
who pointed the finger needed to look at the fact that Canadians, who were never 
hassled, more often took the high-paying, skilled jobs in the United States (Cowen 1986, 
B l).
This cultural misunderstanding only worsened the treatm ent that Hispanics and 
migrants received under the legal system and the by police force. Many Hispanics were 
subject to random raids, which occurred increasingly after 1984 because o f the new 
immigration law. Many police acted on the assumption that all Hispanics were possible 
illegals. They were not cautious because they didn’t have to worry about the individual 
rights of Hispanics who had little political power. This procedure, performed by the INS 
and the local police forces, did not slacken until a suit was brought against them by a 
coalition o f activists and farmers (Oregonian May 6, 1982, B3).
Migrants, along with other Hispanics, experienced injustice under the American 
judicial system. Until recently, it had been illegal for them to work but not for growers 
to  hire them. The Reverend Richard Knusel, director o f Portland Hispanic Ministry 
stated, "in the 10 years I ’ve worked in this state I ’ve practically never seen an 
immigration service raid during a harvest season. The raids come before the harvest, 
after the harvest or in the middle of winter, but never during the harvest itself'
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(Kirchmeier 1980, B3). The new law under IRCA remained unenforced (McCarthy 
1990a, Bl).
Discrimination also occurred in the sentencing o f migrants who had committed 
crimes. In Multnomah County incarcerated migrants arrested for minor drug dealing or 
found without documentation, 85% of whom had no prior felony conviction, were 
spending significantly more time in jail than non-Hispanic criminals committing felonies 
(Campillo 1990, B2; Moore 1990, C2 ).
A case that typified the treatment of migrants in the legal system concerned a 
young man named Santiago Ventura Morales. Arrested, he was tried and found guilty 
of the murder of another migrant. Several jurors complained o f doubts they had about 
the results and the case was publicized. Aside from inappropiate court instructions to 
the jurors, other matters complicated this case. While his court appointed defense 
attorney appeared grossly negligent in his effort, the police interrogation remained in 
question. One of the prosecution’s two witnesses, Juan Remegio Estrada, gave a 
deposition to Ventura’s lawyers in 1991, which stated that Canby police detective 
Timothy Skipper coerced false testimony from Estrada. Estrada claimed that Skipper 
said, "you’re all drunkards and you’re all bad" (Stanford 1991, C l). Court recordings 
imply that racial slurs were made by the judge and defense attorney during the case.
What showed further cultural insensitivity and personal negligence was that the case was 
heard in English and interpreted in Spanish. Ventura was proficient in neither language 
since he only spoke an Indian dialect (Ellis 1990, A23). Finally, after spending four 
years in jail Ventura was pardoned by Governor Goldschmidt in 1991.
Hispanic distrust of the police forces of local communities has remained very 
high. The police were seen as insensitive to the culture o f the Hispanics. Verbal or
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body language miscommunication created life threatening situations for the Hispanics 
who dealt with the police. Police misjudged latino body language as volatile or defiant. 
This resulted in more aggressive police responses. O ther stereotypes led police to be 
unfairly suspicious and defensive. Hispanics in turn, became more uncooperative.
During one violent incident in Woodburn there were 60 Hispanic witnesses, but none 
would speak to the police (Hilderbrand 1983, B3).
Both the Klamath Falls and Woodburn police forces were accused o f police 
brutality, prejudice and cultural insensitivity by Hispanic migrants and perm anent 
residents. In both towns unarmed migrants were killed in the act o f arrest during 
non-violent crimes (Manzano 1987, B l; Mayer 1983, MWG1). Few Hispanic police 
officers worked in these towns. In 1984 one Spanish-speaking policeman was hired in 
Woodburn. Nyssa only had two Hispanic policemen (Cowen 1987a, A l; Ulrich 1984,
C2). Recently, some improvements in police relations were made in W oodburn after 
community activists insisted on changes, but each step took determined grassroots’ 
pressure (Coonrod 1985, B2).
Unfortunately, tensions have continued to rise. Many migrants began carrying 
weapons to protect themselves and establish their own justice since they did not feel that 
the police did that for them (Mayer 1983, MWG1). To them, the American police may 
not be much different then the dishonest and corrupt police in their own country.
CONTRACTORS
The migrants were in many aspects controlled and manipulated by a variety of 
groups and factors. Throughout the period from 1940 to 1990 little changed in the way 
the farmers and contractors treated the migrants. Contractors were the ones who were
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most closely connected to the migrants and it is easy to see their effect. They were 
capable o f doing great service o r great harm to the migrants. M ost often, while the 
fanner took their profits from the workings o f the contractor, the contractor in turn 
squeezed the farmworkers for his profit.
The large landowning farmers, often organized into associations for recruiting 
purposes, relied on the contractors to be their right-hand men, managing the workforce 
and thus allowing the farmers to further remove themselves from direct contact with the 
migrants. Most often contractors were used by the larger farms, sugar companies in 
eastern Oregon and other food processing companies that purchase entire crops ahead 
of the harvest. With contractors, farmers could get large numbers o f workers in the field 
at the exact time needed. Farmers kept up-to-date information on contractors so that 
companies could wire an agent in another state in the Southwest for labor at any given 
time (Gamboa 1984, 41).
Many workers discovered that if they were not with a contractor they could not 
find as much work because most large farmers preferred to  use a contractor because it 
freed them from travel and recruitment and management responsibilities. In 1961 one 
reporter stated, "the labor contractors and their crews always seem to have first choice.
If you are not with a contractor it is difficult to get placed" (Bianco 1961, 21). Small 
farmers didn’t like the contractors because they were more expensive than hiring 
children, the urban unemployed from skid row, or migrant families on their own. But, 
without a contractor work was not as consistent or as easy to find. Employment without 
a contractor lasted a shorter number o f days and required more travelling to each new 
site (Bianco 1962b, 27).
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Contractors were the ones who recruited, hired, supervised and paid the workers 
much of the time. The contractor was most often o f Mexican descent, with most 
unrelated to their crews. The average age of contractors was 40. The job was 
transitional for many, with their stay in this position averaging five years. Eighty percent 
were first generation Mexican-Americans, five percent were second generation, with 15% 
having lived 10 years in the States. Many spoke both Spanish and English and often 
"represents[ed] or controlled] virtually every phase o f the life o f his crew" (Cowen 
1987a, A l; Infante and Current 1958, C2).
While some contractors are part of a family unit and make an honest living, with 
a few even providing real protection and support, much o f the reporting and studies 
done by newspapers and government studies discovered contractors to have been a 
corrupt lot working within a powerful hierarchical system (Bianco 1958, Floyd 1968, 
Infante and Current 1958). In the 1950s the state was divided into territories, run by a 
few men who worked many subcontractors, handling the best farms with the best 
earnings and housing, guaranteeing labor to farms, recruiting in the Southwest, 
supervising workers, and maintaining, or claiming to maintain, payroll, tax, and social 
security records (Infante and Current 1958, C3). One contractor solely controlled a 
whole county and another owned 39 vehicles, handling 2,200 workers and 22 
subcontractors (Olmos 1970, 8).
Many contractors took advantage of the fact that the migrants didn’t know the 
system. Another contractor helped two men get free health care and then charged them, 
telling them he paid for it (Infante and Current 1958, C3). Some loaned money at high 
interest rates to workers, set up credit in local stores and taverns, and dabbled in 
markets of prostitution, drugs and gambling. Contractors were also known to force local
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businessmen to pay a percentage o f the amount spent in their business by the migrants.
When one grocer refused to go along with this "deal" the contractors involved made sure
that no one shopped there, bringing his profits down 90% (Bianco 1958b, 1). Some even
paid them their wages in a tavern where they would proceed to spend it. The 1958
Bureau o f Labor report stated:
There appears to be a hierachy of powerful contractors who 
coordinate the criminal slideline of the subcontractor . . .  
punish[ing] those who do not subm it.. . .  This is not a 
hastily contrived pattern . . .  but ra th e r . . .  well 
coordinated by a few people. There can be little doubt that 
the present contractors are a factor in suppressing the 
progress o f the Spanish American migrant farmworker 
towards full citizenship and Americanization. There can be 
little doubt that these social conditions are a threat to the 
health of the communities and the agricultural industry, as 
well (Infante and Current 1958, C9).
It is interesting to note that this report by Infante was adamantly denied by growers’
leagues and associations.
Many accounts of unethical recruiting and false promises and record keeping 
continued to be reported. Contractors paid their workers less than they earned, keeping 
the rest for themselves. The state Human Rights Advisoiy Council was told of recruiting 
in New Mexico with ads promising "free child care services, payment for transportation 
cost, pay advances upon arrivals, use of surplus foods and a guarantee of 3 months work." 
Similarly, posters promised free doctors, nurses, hospital care, dentist and daycare 
centers. In this case, when workers arrived farmers referred them to the community 
public health and child care agencies (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 10; Rural 
Tribune September 1978, 1). A study of 100 migrants reported 90% o f them stating that 
they were cheated by employers on payroll deductions (Cowen 1987a, A l).
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With the heavy recruiting in the Southwest, many of the workers sought after 
were non-farmworkers who, unaware of the realities, could be easily convinced to join 
because o f the wonderful advantages and offerings. O ther cases included recruitment o f 
illegal migrants, bringing workers in weeks early to keep the wages down, supplying credit 
and then forcing them to work a lower wage than either first told or set by the 
government (Chan 1990; Infante and Current 1958; Stein 1990). In one case, a 
M edford-area contractor never paid them any wages at all (Hamilton 1990, C3).
Contractors set up a system o f dealing with those who tried to get out from under 
them: taking away registration papers; threatening to turn in illegals; loaning money; 
getting workers drunk or loaded on marijuana; blacklisting them; o r warning that he 
would tell o ther workers that the migrant was a government informer (Bianco 1962; 
Infante and Current 1958; Hamilton 1990; Stein 1990).
Laws regulating contractors remain lenient. Oregon statutes did not make any 
distinction between contractors and crewleaders, allowing for loopholes. Contractors 
were required only to register with the state, while crewleaders registered with the federal 
government. No written contracts were required and thus there was little way to enforce 
agreements. Inspections were rare and little verification was ever demanded to show that 
these contractors were paying for social security for the wages o f his employees or 
providing old age, survivors’ and disability insurance as required.
In 1989 the regulations on contractors were tightened. After the enactment of 
IRCA, which specifically limited funded services to legally documented workers, local 
clergy, health workers and government officials clamped down on contractors. They 
insisted that legal measures be taken so that contractors were required to begin providing 
housing and food for their workers who were being recruited early and were forced to go
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without food or a place to lodge. Contractors must now provide those services until the 
jobs are available. Enforcement, however, is still minimal (Blackmun 1990, 4MEP8).
NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRENDS
Ultimately, the economic system functioning in the United States has created 
unstable and fluctuating economic conditions that have required low-paying migrant 
labor. The churnings of the capitalist system, founded on private property and 
competition for land and money, is reflected in the treatm ent and conditions o f  the 
Hispanic and other farmworkers. With profit as the goal, exploitation o f labor has 
resulted. Fluctuations in the market due to overproduction, expansion and consolidation 
have caused great pain for farmworkers and for the small farmers who often employed 
them.
This trend of development began in the late 1800s. As the economy and position 
o f farmers and farm laborers continued to change, the employer-employee relationship 
became increasingly impersonal, and the worker, unable to obtain farm ownership, 
suffered a low status in society, inducing many to migrate to the cities (Feise 1978).
It must be stated that the system at work, which encourages both the 
accumulation o f land and wealth and competition between those trying to accumulate 
wealth, creates within agribusiness a fierce struggle for survival, especially among those at 
the bottom. Corporate farms producing food at lower costs in Third World countries 
added another level o f competition (Hightower 1973, 80). And as the large farmers 
continued to strengthen and develop, they dominated small farm and farmworker 
interests when it came to influencing government policy making. Agricultural workers 
and small farmers found they could not depend on equal government support. Even
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government support intended for the struggling farmers often ended up in the hands of 
those most capable of controlling political power -- the large farmers o r investors, who 
lobbied for increasing government aid that directly helped them while hurting the small 
farmers and farmworkers.
U nder this system, accumulation of private property on a large scale accelerated 
during the Gilded Age, a time of graft and corruption. Between 1862 and 1891 the 
government sold more land than was homesteaded, which led to massive land speculation 
and m onopolization,". . .  contrary to the expectation of the democratic forces that had 
fought for free homesteads" (Feise 1978, 79).
As the decades passed, with each new economic depression, more and more small 
and average farmers could not sustain their incomes, selling out to those who had surplus 
capital to hold them over. The government and banks participated in this by foreclosing 
on those who could not pay taxes or loan payments.
In addition this large-scale emphasis has hurt small farmers by further increasing 
costs, making banks finance the bigger, "low risk" farms, which in turn has forced more 
specialization, which again in turn has led to the processor biting off a bigger chunk of 
profit. M ore recently, along with large farms loaded with government aid, natural 
elements, intrusion on land base by surburbia and increased taxes has caused further 
damage to small farms (Young and Caday 1979, 23). The end result can be seen by the 
drop in the number of farms in the United States from 6,812 million to 2,786 million 
from 1935 and 1976 (Feise 1978, 79).
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Before 1930 Oregon farmers experienced the same regular slumps and periods of 
prosperity that farmers throughout the nation did. In the west, land remained for a 
longer time cheaper and more available, with the same speculation trends occurring a 
few decades later. Small, self-sufficient farming prevailed, with larger-scale production 
beginning at the turn o f the century when the railway and other transportation systems 
came to the Pacific Northwest (Blok 1974, 10).
In the 1930s the Depression, similar in consequences to the other slumps before 
it, hit Oregon hard. For example, Oregon farmers’ inability to pay taxes led to the 
repossession of 1,150,000 rural acres in 1930 and 1,778,273 acres in 1936 (compared to 
almost none in 1915) (Gamboa 1984, 32). These lands were incorporated into larger 
farms, which were successful because they could expand or alter their crops as necessary 
(Blok 1974, 111).
For those who survived the 1930s the two following decades were prosperous. 
The wartime demand for food led to the rise in agricultural production. Now, the 
farmers had another sort o f problem. The labor reserve that had existed during the 
Depression disappeared with labor shortages in the Pacific Northwest reaching a greater 
crisis point than nationally because o f Oregon’s record production. As in other parts of 
the nation, Anglo workers headed for the shipyards and aircraft factories, which in the 
Northwest was centered in Seattle, Portland and Vancouver. Worsening the agricultural 
labor shortage, the production increase in sugar beets, suddenly more profitable with 
new protection from tariffs, required tremendous amounts o f labor, needed twice a year 
in eastern Oregon. The farmers were at a loss; they could no longer rely on the Anglos 
who could turn to government work projects or the war effort instead of the low wages
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the farmers offered. The 1937 Sugar Act which prohibited children under the age o f 14 
from working, and children between the age of 14 and 16 from working m ore than 8 
hours a day, further worsened the labor shortage.
By the end o f the 1950s a different kind of crunch occurred, setting trends that 
have lasted to the present. Land prices, taxes and the cost o f maintaining the new larger 
farm took their toll. With the introduction of chemicals, fertilizer and pesticides, costs 
skyrocketed. In Oregon, the percentage of the total costs of farming required by 
mechanization jum ped 24% for Oregon farmers between 1950 and 1966, while the use of 
fertilizer increased 375% (Fabiyi 1969, 51). And, nationally between 1965 and 1975 the 
substitution of capital for labor climbed 300% (Feise 1978, 72).
Thus, the need for a large labor force slowed as mechanization took its place, 
even if at a little slower pace than elsewhere in the nation, although in Oregon snap 
beans, strawberries, cherries, and pears would remain, much to the dismay o f the 
farmers, persistently labor-intensive. During the 1950s and 1960s the use o f labor by 
farmers dropped around 36%, with labor as a percentage o f farm ers’ costs falling from 
40% to 19%. Production per-man-hour also increased tremendously between 1950 and 
1966, with vegetable production rising 74%, fruit production 23% and feed grains 300% 
(Oregon Governor Task Force 1969, 1).
This search for labor-saving, or as farmers felt more comfortable putting it, 
cost-saving, devices, on which the government spent so much time and money, worsened 
the plight of all but the large farmer. The kind of research prioritized was geared 
towards the larger farm, remaining unaffordable and inefficient for middle-sized and 
small farms. Smaller farms, unable to compete, found it harder and harder to survive.
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When some chose to expand to keep up they often encountered an indebtedness they 
never imagined.
This was a time o f continued consolidation, with many small farm ers falling by 
the wayside. There seem ed no other option, either expand or leave the market. Oregon 
farms fell in number from 63,000 to 43,000 between 1950 and 1966. Both the acreage 
and the number o f farmers declined, although the average farm grew 150 acres between 
1950 and 1960 and the total production increased 19% between 1958 and 1968 (Fabiyi 
1969, 30; Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 1).
For those who did expand to survive, the bank, the processor, and other 
middlemen in this increasingly specialized kind of farming became m ore and more 
controlling, setting requirements and taking a huge profit, especially in the refinancing of 
loans. In Oregon in the 1960’s farmers only received 50% of the price paid by retailers 
(Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 1). Thus, while productivity increased, more 
farms collapsed and the exploitation of labor continued to rise, allowing for the largest 
farms to reap a greater profit and invest in the cheap land of bankrupted farmers.
To further complicate matters, the debts that smaller farmers acquired in order 
to buy this labor-saving, production-increasing equipment forced growers to try to  cut 
costs even more in other ways, and the labor variable continued to be their easiest 
choice. As well, for all farmers the unpredictability o f the Northwest weather and its 
effect on the farmers’ harvest required the need for short-term surplus labor. Though 
the farmers might agree that a perm anent labor force would be better for the migrants, 
they could not afford to make this their responsibility (Interview. Jack Corbett 1990).
The large farms, more often family-owned than corporate farms in Oregon, raced 
further and further away from the rest of the pack. A study o f the W illamette Valley in
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
47
the 1970s showed this trend. Farmers in this region with over 500 acres o f land 
increased nearly three times, from 12 to 43 farms, while farmers with over 2,000 acres 
multiplied ninefold, from two to 18 farms between 1930 and 1970 (Van Otten 1978, 156). 
By the 1960s these top Oregon farmers made the public believe that all farmers were 
doing well because the large farmers represented wealth and power. In 1969, farmers 
were valued at 500 million dollars annually, and ranked as the second largest industry in 
Oregon. As well, Oregon ranked fifth in the use of migrant labor in the country 
(Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 1).
Initially the 1970’s looked like they would be good to more farmers. A growth in 
exports from global demand, coupled with the decline o f the U.S. dollar, caused a rise in 
prices and led farmers, with the banks’ encouragement, to see wisdom in expanding their 
size. But then, nationally land prices shot higher than inflation, taxes surged and the 
farm real estate debt tripled. The farmers were by now in seemingly irreversible debt 
(Sommers 1988, 54).
Consumers also began to demand that farmers drop their prices, eventually 
boycotting meat. More farmers went under, while those who remained converted to less 
labor-intensive crops and again tried to reduce the only cost they felt they had control 
over, labor (Sommers 1988, 54).
By the late sixties, much of the labor in Oregon was foreign and undocumented, 
which satisfied the farmers because few regulations covered them, and, out of fear of 
being deported, they were less likely to complain (Galarza 1964; Robertson 1969). The 
recesssion during the 1970s in the Southwest had pushed m ore Mexican-Americans who 
had tried their luck at other jobs to return to migrant labor, which allowed the farmers
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to keep the wages extremely low (Wells 1976, 268). Small farmers, who couldn’t afford 
the expensive machinery, relied heavily on the cheap migrant labor.
In the 1980’s unfavorable conditions continued. Many large investors moved out 
o f the agricultural sector and into the industrial sector or exported their capital to  the 
Third World. The expansion of the foreign market for agricultural products from .57 to 
23 billion dollars between 1969 and 1976 reflected this trend (Feise 1978, 100). The 
global demand that seemed so sure dropped, and while prices and real interest rates 
stayed up land value fell. Then, lenders, who assessed land values as constituting 75% of 
the total farm assets, backed off on giving more or renewed loans, and more small and 
middle-sized farms collapsed (Sommers 1988, 54). While a few small farmers developed 
a new philosophy on surviving, most middle-sized and small farmers, having attem pted to 
expand, continued to struggle desperately. The fact that many have stayed in farming 
attests more to small farmers’ commitment to their way of life and livelihood than to 
their desire for profit (Young and Caday 1979, 16).
OREGON FARMERS
Profile
Oregon farmers as a group represented wealth and power. And yet, despite all 
o f this, approximately 80% of the farmers in Oregon remained deeply in debt, with many 
o f them declaring bankruptcy each year, followed by consolidation of land by the larger 
farms o r real estate investors, industry or sprawling suburbs. Between 1950 and 1960 
alone the number o f farms declined from 63,000 to 43,000 (Fabiyi 1969, 24). This large 
percentage o f small farmers, each grossing less than $40,000 a year, grew 15% of 
Oregon’s farm produce, did much of the labor themselves and hired farmworkers for a
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short period of time each year (Young 1982, 209). Because small farmers lacked 
resources, however, they did not have access to as much machinery as the larger farms 
and thus used a far greater percentage o f farmworkers than the larger farms. Their 
economic condition directly affected their ability to offer proper housing and fair wages 
to workers.
Social factors also played into the farmers’ treatm ent o f the workers. The 
preconceived ideas farmers held o f the workers and the lack o f direct contact with them 
because of the use of contractors often allowed small and large farmers alike to be 
unconcerned. But, economic conditions created the strongest responses. As the small 
farmer continued to struggle, and the larger farmer profit, farmworker conditions 
remained a low priority.
One study in 1977 in Polk County found that, on the average, small farmers 
received annual government aid equalling twenty dollars. In a 1974 study done on the 
small farmers of the Willamette Valley, the total gross income averaged was $12,419 with 
the gross income from product sales $1,230. Fifty-four percent of these farmers reported 
losses after calculating their net incomes (Blok 1974, 111). Forty-six percent in Oregon 
worked over 100 days outside o f their farms, and in one study o f Polk County small 
farmers 33% held full time jobs while many of their spouses also worked part-time 
(Young and Caday 1979, 17). In 1978 a study in Washington County found 50% of the 
1,090 farms there grossed less than $2500 the previous year. A  few farmers thrived while 
the rest crept along. One hundred thirty-one sold over $100,000 that same year (Rural 
Tribune August 1978, 1). Small farms continue to struggle for their survival, selling land, 
taking losses, or foreclosing. Many of those who did not foreclose tried to expand, 
leasing up to 55% of the land they farmed (Blok 1974,156; Van Otten 1978, 63).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
50
Although they watched the farm they grew up on crumbling, they rem ained rooted in the 
belief that it was the only way of life (Young 1982, 209).
Political Actions o f Oregon Farmers
Farmers, united in growers’ leagues, societies and associations often controlled by 
the larger farmers, lobbied and conferred in order to create a profitable environment for 
themselves. For example, the Oregon Horticultural Society, the states’ oldest and largest 
agricultural organization, regularly lobbied in Washington for the farmers. Many 
associations in the Northwest were set up in the 1930s for the purpose of stopping 
communist and radical "agitators" (Gamboa 1984, 333). They attem pted to maintain a 
surplus labor m arket to keep wages low and prevent unionism, to secure government aid, 
to keep unwanted laws from being passed while keeping the enforcement o f existing 
restrictions lax, to replace disruptive government officials or discourage meddling 
volunteers, and to promote a positive image to the public and the government.
In order to maintain a positive image farmers often sought the use o f the press, 
and warned that this law or that demand from the migrants would force them under, 
push prices up or destroy small farmers and let big out-of-state corporations take over.
In some cases farmers feared that the profit margin would decline if a particular bill was 
passed. But small farmers would have been better off in the long run if they had not 
allowed the large farmers to regularly speak for them and promote large farm interests 
as their own.
Since the early 1900s, Oregon farmers pushed the government to help them.
After 1900 farmers’ associations organized into granges, alliances and farm bureaus, 
lobbied for improving the state o f Oregon’s roads. The Grange also actively involved
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
51
itself by pushing for agricultural education and research funded by the government 
through county fairs and state horticultural societies (Blok 1974, 1)
Usually the farmers preferred that the government take a hands-off approach to 
most issues concerning the migrants unless they were being pressured to do something 
themselves, and this attitude hurt the migrants tremendously. If  pressured, however, 
farmers demanded that the government fund any improvement in the migrants’ 
conditions, refusing to take responsibility themselves. The large farmers, who could have 
afforded to house and pay farmworkers better, manipulated the plight of the small 
farmers by saying that it was the state of all farmers, justifying their position by claiming 
that they couldn’t afford these costs and thus couldn’t make improvements either. The 
following statem ent of one Oregon farmer is representative o f those found regularly in 
the press: "If anybody is poorer than we are, I ’d like to see them" (Oimos 1968c, 27).
The use o f we lumped all farmers together in the public eye, discouraging any knowledge 
o f the division between small and large farms. Another example was when activists 
organized a "Poor People’s March" which should have included small farmers. But, the 
plight o f the small farmer was used to destroy the purpose o f this march, as one farmer 
reported to the press that he was against "this march thing" because the government will 
get "too tough" with the small farmer and then "food prices will really go up" (Olmos 
1968c, 27).
In reality, many small farmers saw corporate farmers as different from 
themselves. Their distrust was directed towards the large farms and the government who 
combined, it seemed, to the small farmer, to work hand in hand (Young and Caday 
1979, 14). In fact, many small farmers perceived the government as one o f their main 
problems, or put more clearly, as one of their main enemies. The small farm ers’ lack of
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power or voice, however, left them no option but to go along with the growers’ leagues, 
hoping that some of the farm lobby gains would help the small farmer as well.
Another approach the farmers took was to lobby for those governmment officials, 
politicians or activists who aided them and to oppose those whom they saw as disruptive. 
A  fine example o f this was the national battle that took place between the conservative 
American Farm Bureau Federation and liberal New Deal politicians in the USDA and 
the FSA in the 1940s. Though it is an early example it is useful in its representation of 
the farm lobby’s tactics. Like others around the nation, the N W  Farm News encouraged 
farmers to write congress opposing the New Deal "radical FSA policies" that would have 
set a minimum wage and other labor conditions for the farmworker as well as 
rehabilitation programs for the small farmer. The association was very aware that these 
rehabilitation programs would have kept the small farmers from being low wage earners. 
Not only did the farmers prevent such legislation, they also succeeded in getting 
Roosevelt to transfer the responsibility to the more conservative WPA and to weaken 
the FSA by slashing its appropiations to 70% (Gamboa 1984, 87).
This kind of unification occurred in 1970 when the potato farmers gathered in 
Klamath county as a growers’ league to demand that the local Council o f Churches 
volunteer group cease its investivation o f migrants’ working conditions. Claiming the 
volunteers had "caused us quite a bit of trouble," their representative went on to say: 
"We’ve never been happy with the Council o f Churches. It has seemed more interested 
in bettering the laborers’ social standards than their religious needs" (Austermann 1970, 
31).
The farmers could destroy a politician’s or a government official’s career, as they 
did with Bureau of Labor Director Marcontonio Infante’s when he began speaking up in
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
53
an almost militant fashion for the migrants and the conditions the farmers continued to 
impose on them, coming out with an inflammatory report that the press picked up in 
1958. The Fruit Growers’ League o f Jackson County demanded to the state and to  the 
politicians that he be fired, and that the report be withdrawn from the public libraiy.
And, as if that wasn’t enough, they framed him on trum ped up drug lord charges which 
they circulated in the press. In the end, one of the few government employed advocates 
for migrant labor was taken out of office (Bianco 1962c, 23).
But, one may ask, how could these farmers act this way? Partially, the drive for 
money and power is at fault, but the farmers’ perspective also added and still adds to 
their ability to believe what they are doing is right. Gamboa states that the farmers of 
the 1940s and 1950s, "although conscious o f their treatm ent of the Mexican and 
Mexican-American workers, cared more about production and profits and less about 
human value" (Gamboa 1984, 3). The more removed a farmer is from his workers or 
the workplace, the more out of touch he is with the reality of the workers’ conditions or 
his impact on those conditions. His awareness of the conditions and his impact on them 
becomes in his memory more and more vague as he distances himself. It makes it easier 
for him to wash his hands of guilt and rely on stereotypes about the migrant, making it 
seem as though it’s as much the fault of the migrants as his fault.
As the following example so clearly shows, the farmers’ insights lose a sense of
reality about these people they are so directly connected to: One writer for the N W
Farm News wrote in the 1940s:
Contrary to the morbid story told by John Steinbeck in 
Grapes of Wrath, harvesting the vegetables and fruits of 
Oregon is an aspiring industry. There’s the job o f being in 
the out-of-doors; working at top efficiency in the cool of 
the morning and slowing to a more languid pace as the 
noon sun warms the back and relaxes the spirit. There’s
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
54
joy in handling the ripe round fruit either picking or 
packing pears, apples and prunes (Gamboa 1984, 242).
Instead o f facing the fact that most of the housing and work conditions they 
provided for the workers were inhumane, some farmers felt that migrants deserved or 
should get by with that which was no better than what they had had in Mexico, claiming 
that if they replaced or improved it, the migrants would only ruin it again (Gamboa 
1984, 333).
The farmers wanted the government to aid the migrants only as long as the 
control remained in their hands. This was often achieved through the use o f the state 
extension service, which the farmers’ associations controlled. During the bracero 
program, the boards set up to determine wages were controlled by the extension services 
and therefore the wages that farmers offered were often automatically accepted 
(Gamboa 1984, 234). Although occasionally the farmers demanded the state to solve, 
for example, the problem of migrant housing, they did not want government camps to 
return for fear of creating a meeting place for "radicals," which they believed they saw 
happening in the 1930s and 1940s. After the bracero program the farmers bought out 
the government camps, tore them down and replaced them with private camps which 
they could control more effectively. And the end result was that housing prices doubled 
for the migrants while the upkeep decreased (Gamboa 1984, 333). In reality, however, 
farmers may have actually worked against their own profit by not providing conditions 
that would promote commitment, dedication and harder work.
As stated before, farmers felt an urgent need to do whatever possible to 
manipulate and control the labor supply in order to keep wages low, using early 
recruitment, contractors, illegal aliens, government aid, and even scare tactics to prevent 
demands from the workers.
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Farmers wanted to keep union activity from taking off, especially because they 
had seen the effects in California, and to a lesser extent in eastern Washington, both 
during the 1930s and 1940s and during the late 1960s with Cesar Chavez. They kept the 
labor reserve high with early recruitment and the use first o f the braceros, urban 
teenagers, and then illegal aliens. The use o f the braceros was detrimental to any 
improvement in the wages and conditions o f Mexican-American and Anglo migrants, as 
the farmers were well aware. From 1941 to 1950 wages went down 11% for farmworkers 
even while the cost o f living went up 23%. And while industrial wages dropped 34% 
farm wages slid 51%. Neither were benefits like those in the industrial sector gained 
(Gamboa 1984, 349).
When the farmers didn’t like the contract they were forced to abide by under the 
bracero program, they did whatever they could to change it, such as they did when hiring 
a lawyer to change the provisions limiting braceros "to maintaining the work contract," 
which was vague enough to lead to the interpretation that they could not join unions 
(Galarza 1964, 46). They encouraged racial tensions, kicking out the Anglo migratory 
workers when the braceros arrived and later segregating the migrants in the camps 
(Gamboa 1984). O ther times they set up false advertising in order to maintain a high 
reserve. One strong example o f this occurred in 1957 when there had been a lot of labor 
unrest among the migrants. The following year workers were purposely recruited seven 
weeks early and encouraged to run up a bill at the grocery store. Then the wage was 
dropped, forcing them to work at a very low one (Infante and Current 1958, C7).
The farmers used the legislature to control labor as well. Not only did they stall 
many bills that would have restricted farmers, they also pushed through very biased laws, 
such as the anti-picketing law in 1969 (Kadera 1969b, 39). Any time these laws were
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questioned, associations would arrive in Salem to stress their burden. In 1971, when the 
anti-picketing law was discussed, representatives from the Oregon Agricultural 
Association and the Oregon Farm Bureau joined the Oregon Hop Growers claiming that 
they couldn’t afford strikes because o f the vulnerability o f the crop (Hughes 1963, 9; 
Oregonian, 27 April 1971, 2). Examples o f lobbying by farm groups to block legislative 
action occurred on several occasions. Regularly they lobbied to prevent attempts to 
strengthen farm camp regulations in Oregon. They complained o f VISTA and other 
government workers’ efforts to improve conditions, resulting in the cancellation of 
funded projects. Farm associations united to stop IRCA and to halt raids conducted by 
the INS during the harvest season (Gamboa 1984; Hill 1982; Hogan 1982).
In an effort to prevent this inevitable labor unrest many farmers employed armed
guards and demanded police support while lobbying the government for help in
advancing more research on labor-saving machinery to help them eliminate the whole
problem of acquiring workers (Oregonian, 2 August 1970, 38). One statement made in
1971 by an owner of a 250 acre farm in Nyssa, after four Office o f Equal Opportunity
(OEO) workers-activists were fired, clarified the farmers’ main tactics:
Each year each grower puts up several hundreds o f dollars 
to bring farmworkers here and to help operate the 
workers’ camps, but this year some of us are going to put 
the money into development of an onion combine . . .  
reduce the need for farmworkers. We’re small operators 
and just can’t stand the ruckus of strikes and strike threats 
each year" (Guernsey 1971, 1). And another farmer in 
Nyssa stated during one of the many periods of labor 
unrest, "We raised our right arm and swore that from now 
on any crop we plant has to be picked with machinery or 
can walk on and off a truck (Oregonian July 7,1970, 14).
And with government aid in research, the threat was real.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
57
When the workers did strike, farmers might merely starve them out o f the camps 
until they returned to work, ship a few out, or have some jailed for trespassing or 
disorderly conduct (Gamboa 1984, 246).
But most importantly, farmers tried to avoid this by doing almost anything,
except improve conditions, to maintain large numbers through early recruitment,
deceptive attractions and government programs which allowed for a surplus o f labor like
Public Law 78. The President of the Jackson County Fruit Growers League in 1963
clarified with this declaration,
Our growers have time and time again, in fact for 20 years, 
proven that there are just not enough domestic workers 
available to harvest the crop . .  . and to shut off the 
bracero program will hold thousands of workers in Mexico 
in a position of poverty, and that it may very well stimulate 
Communist activity (Bianco 1963a, 15).
One might question whether the treatm ent of the migrants by Oregon farmers wouldn’t
have "stimulated communism" nearly as much.
But farmers did not see things in this light. The Japanese, teenagers, a 
"Woman’s Army," and then the braceros were summoned to work the fields. Everything 
was done to prevent a shortage which might provide the workers the means to demand 
better wages and conditions. And when the bracero program ended, farmers again 
pooled their efforts, recruiting and advertising for workers out o f state, hiring 
contractors or agreeing upon certain levels of wages they were willing to pay that 
particular year. Recruitment was intensified so much that contractors began convincing 
Southwest Hispanics who did not usually migrate to begin. They offered steady jobs, 
modern housing and high wages. One year eight farmers were tried and convicted of 
deceitful recruiting in Texas and New Mexico (Oregonian, 7 July 1970,14). In 1978 500 
migrant workers joined in a class action suit against the Tankersley brothers. They
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charged fraud, false advertising, breach of contract and minimum wage violations. The 
ads listed in New Mexico and Texas recruited Hispanics who had never worked migrant 
labor before by offering $35 a day, three months o f work seven days a week, quality 
housing with indoor hot water, color television, basketball courts, and washing machines. 
The ads also promised transportation to local stores. The reality turned out to be far 
from the offering. With the help o f the Migrant Legal Aid Project in Clackamas 
County, the migrants won this suit (Rural Tribune September 1978,1). But, labor unrest 
continued and was on the rise again in the 1980s. Farmers can merely reminisce about 
the time they had so much more control as one did by saying, "it hasn’t been the same 
since the bracero program" (Kirchmeier 1980, B3).
TH E GOVERNM ENT
Policies
The American political and legal system did not hear all members in society 
equally. It is those who had the expertise, political contacts, and money who influenced 
those making government policy. In this case, the large land owning farmers dominated.
Many representatives of the government justified this support for the large land 
owning farmers by believing that it was in the best interest o f the health o f the state and 
agricultural economy. The government believed that if the farmers profited then 
Oregonians and migrants profited and attempted to help all three by providing aid to the 
farmers. Migrants were generally aided only when the government was pressured by 
citizens united in groups or when the farmers demanded it in order to avoid taking on 
the economic responsibility themselves. That same concern for a healthy economy kept
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those few laws enacted which aided the poor farmers o r farmworkers void o f any solid 
"legal teeth" (Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969,1).
Public sympathy for the nostalgic past o f the American farm er trying to carve out 
the Am erican dream further heightened the government’s efforts to help the farmer. 
Form er Governor o f Oregon Tom McCall reflected on this when he wrote in his 1969 
study, "Mexican-American and White migrants need special attention, but growers and 
processors also have problems" (Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 2).
This leniency towards regulating farms in reality did not help the farmers who 
really needed it. Instead government policies continued to assist the large farmowners, 
creating price supports and a tax structure which led to a regressive redistribution of 
income, raised food prices for the American public between 10% and 20% and gave 
substantial federal gifts to property owners. One example of this was seen in 1967 under 
the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. Fifty percent of the payments 
went to eight percent of producers and nine percent o f the payments went to 50% of the 
producers (Milk 1972, 23).
A nother philosophical factor played into the motives behind what the 
government chose to do. Very clearly, helping some farmers earn a significant profit 
margin was a higher priority than trying to create employment and a livelihood for large 
numbers o f people. The "trickle-down theory" was in effect. In 1972 for example 750 
million dollars were spent on production research. In 1969, 6,000 man/years o f research 
in experiment stations were funded with only 289 o f those, less than five percent, aimed 
at "people-oriented research" (Hightower 1973, 1,6). This attempt, which specifically 
benefited large farms, was funded by public taxes, including those of the struggling 
farmer (Hightower 1973; Milk 1972).
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It is not surprising, then, to find that the government, as a whole, did not create 
laws and restrictions to allow for the small land owning farmers or the migrants to have 
an equal standing with the large farm holders. While the larger land owning farmers, 
who lobbied long and hard, were seen as an important link in Oregon’s prosperity, the 
small land owning farmers were encouraged to abandon farming and pushed into the 
urban areas while the migrants remained, in the eyes o f the government, cheap labor and 
an economic burden (Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969). Ignored and invisible, 
migrants crowded "into shacks in rural areas, hidden from public view." Legislators and 
activists fought an impossible battle trying to allocate money to those who supposedly 
didn’t exist (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
The plight o f the migrants was not helped since they were seen as one of the 
major expenses, and therefore troubles, of the small farmer, who was already in 
economic trouble. The cost of migrant labor, instead of the economic system or the 
result of previous government actions, became the scapegoat for the collapse o f the 
small farmer. When they were not seen as the blame, the transient migrant workers 
were still not an issue the government felt it had to contend with, especially for 
politicians who saw them, in particular in later years, not only as a racial minority but 
also as largely foreign-born. Since migrants did not have the power to pull political 
strings, they could be safely ignored (Hightower 1973; Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 
August 1990; Tomar 1988).
Another belief reinforced the lack of incentive the government held in helping 
migrants, and more specifically Hispanic migrants. While Anglo migrant workers were 
given infrequent opportunities through government programs before and during the 
recovery of the economy after the Depression o f the 1930s, the government most often
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saw the Hispanic migrants as a permanent, impoverished group, incapable o f being 
helped. No land grants, farm aid or settlement efforts were offered to Hispanic migrants 
as they were to the others during the New Deal. And no effort was made to understand 
or make adjustments to the varying culture o f these Americans, whom they often 
considered outsiders (Gamboa 1984, 3, 131). This further reduced any effectiveness the 
government had when it instituted policies to provide for the migrants.
The message the government received as to what the farmers needed came 
almost solely from the large farm owners. The wealthy farmers, and businessmen 
representing farm interests, led the farm bureaus, the agricultural councils, the marketing 
cooperatives and the college extension complex (Oregonian, 10 April 1973, 22) 
Organizations lobbied through "a network of private and semi-official users’ committees, 
county and state advisory boards and employment services" (Hawley 1966, 163).
Rural congressmen who came from politically safe, one-party districts and who
often supported the farm lobby had by the 1950s accumulated senority, placing them in
key committee chairmanships in Capitol Hill. These rural representatives and senators
were often assigned to agricultural committees, insuring that "farm pressure groups
receive[d] a highly favorable hearing" (Hawley 1966, 164).
The result in many rural areas was an axis of power that 
ran from the growers’ organizations to the processing 
companies to the local chambers of commerce, and it was 
only natural that local officials, county agents and state 
administrators should go along with the established order, 
especially when it was reinforced by rural 
over-representation and backed by the conservative 
orientation o f most o f the agricultural colleges and state 
farm agencies (Hawley 1966, 163).
The forming of the Commission on Agricultural W orkers is an example of 
farmers and representatives of farm organizations being regularly assigned positions on
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government agencies, committees and bureaus, and thus the biased support government 
gave to large farm interests. This commission, formed under the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act o f 1986, held the responsibility o f assessing whether agriculture should 
continue to remain outside the realm of modern labor-management techniques, given 
special attention by the government in finding labor sources, and be void o f the 
regulations o f the National Labor Relations Act (Hancock 1990, B7). Typically, its 
twelve members represented almost solely the farmers’ perspective, with seven being 
large farm growers or representing grower organizations. On the o ther hand only one 
m ember was a labor representative and none were Hispanic (Hancock 1990, B7).
State legislators, heavily lopsided in their alignment with the farm lobby, carefully 
directed any funding that did come the way of migrants. If  an agency did not spend 
monies as deemed appropiate, its program would be discontinued. In 1979 Oregon 
Rural Opportunities, a non-profit agency, got so frustrated with this that they 
successfully sued the U.S. Department of Labor for its loss o f money without apparent 
reason (Rural Tribune January 1979, 1).
The government also poured money into the research complex and set up 
legislation to maintain labor as it best benefited these farmers. P.L. 78 served this 
purpose during the 1950s and 1960s while the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
fulfilled the same during the 1980s. Lax border patrols and INS raids occurring after the 
harvest allowed farmers cheap labor. Within this effort to aid the farm ers the 
government also purposely aimed to destroy unionization, consequently eliminating the 
chance for improvement for the migrants. When the 1969 Oregon G overnor’s Task 
Force wrote in its Report to the Governor that "the danger o f unionization is not very
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great," the implication was that unions were a destructive force to be prevented (Oregon 
Governor’s Task Force 1969, 2).
Government funded agricultural research began in 1887. This ran under a state 
agricultural college system through the Hatch Act, and after 1914 via the D epartm ent of 
Agriculture’s Cooperative Extension Service. The agricultural extension colleges 
attem pted to reduce the migrant problem by minimizing the need for migrants, driving 
ahead at full force to invent mechanization (Hightower 1973; Milk 1972). The thust of 
the research was to perfect specialized, one-crop production, hybrid crops picked by 
machine, rather than self-sufficient farming. The research complex envisioned large 
farms as perfection. This effort proved successful, eliminating the need for many of the 
migrants while destroying small, labor-intensive farms. Though not everyone supported 
this vision o f the government, those who had the most money, resources and power 
became the loudest and directed this push along. W hether this was ultimately "success" 
for Oregonians is altogether another question (Blok 1974; Van O tten 1978; Young and 
Caday 1979). Critics claimed that the research complex misspent the public’s investment 
for the needs o f the average farmer, "undertaken with a focus on profit, without concern 
for those hurt, and . . . accountable only to private interests" (Feise 1978, 5).
This agricultural research complex also participated directly in finding the easiest 
ways for farmers to solve their labor problems, allowing them to avoid dealing with the 
demands o f a smaller workforce. Very succinctly, Jack Hanna, breeder of the hybrid 
hard tom ato developed for mechanical harvesting, states the reasoning behind this 
government-funded research: "I’ve seen nationality after nationality out in the fields and 
I felt that someday we might run out of nationalities to exploit" (Perelman 1977, 73).
One UC Davis engineer, who had worked 13 years improving the lettuce harvester
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within the government-funded agricultural extension service, described the chief 
advantage of the machine, saying, it "won’t strike, it will work when they want it to work" 
(Perelm an 1977, 75).
Researchers emphasized the great "social benefits" of the new machinery such as 
the new employment in processing and the money put into the m arket generated by 
increased production. They did not look at the fact that farmers were paid to produce 
less, that the machinery was far too expensive for 80% of the farm ers to use, and that it 
allowed a few large farmers to profit while smaller farmers went bankrupt and migrants 
jobless.
Though many have been encouraged to believe the course that agricultural
economy took, o f bankrupted small farms and the expansion of a few, was inevitable,
this is questionable. After looking at the direction the agricultural colleges and
extension services advised the government and farmers to pursue, it becomes clear that
farmers were influenced to take a particular, and in many aspects, destructive path.
Indeed, the research complex "played an ever more important role in the creation of
circumstance which caused farmers to change their strategies of agricultural resource
use" (Blok 1974, 1). Futhermore,
The greatest failing of the land grant research is its total 
abdication of leadership. At a time when rural America 
desperately needjed] leadership, the land grant community 
had ducked behind the corporate skirt, mumbling 
apologetic words like "progress," "efficiency" and 
"inevitability." Overall, it is a pedantic and cowardly 
research system, and America is less for it (Hightower 
1973, 85).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
65
Programs
P.L. 78, the bracero program, is the best example of how the federal government 
aided the farmers in acquiring cheap labor, simultaneously preventing domestic labor 
from establishing government protection or improved conditions. Just as the 
government had forced 50,000 Mexicans across the border during the depression, during 
the post-war period they contracted with the Mexican government to hire braceros 
(Galarza 1964, 47; Gamboa 1982,175).
Farmers liked the braceros for its obvious advantages: Cheap labor with few 
obligations. During the bracero program, 1953 to 1963, migrant wages rose from 83 
cents to $1.03 while bracero wages remained at 80 cents. If  transportation, loss o f money 
to the U.S. economy because of the contractual agreement to send 50% of their wages 
back to Mexico, meals, association dues for farmers to get them, contracting fees, and 
camp supervision costs were all counted, the real expense would be known. But farmers 
and the government supported this more expensive labor because they didn’t have to 
concede to higher wages and other demands for improved work conditions. The use of 
the braceros put pressure on the majority of farmworkers, who were not braceros, to 
work for a lower wage (Gamboa 1984, 22). These Mexican nationals were also effective 
strikebreakers, used, for example, to end the 32 month old strike in California against 
the DiGiorgio Fruit Company by the National Farm Labour Union (Robertson 1969,
18). The bracero program ended only when American unemployment rose again due to 
mechanization, though activists had to fight against the farm lobby to the very end to 
term inate this.
After the bracero program the government continued its services for Northwest 
farmers with the extension service paving the way for the use of Mexican-Americans
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from the Southwest. The extension service planned conferences, contacted contractors, 
designed advertisements, and set up centers as stopping places so Mexican-Americans 
wouldn’t stay in towns where they might disturb Oregonians (Gamboa 1984, 294).
The government also encouraged the use of cheap labor from Mexico by 
maintaining a vague open door policy at the Mexican border from the end o f the bracero 
program until the 1980s, pretending migrants weren’t coming across for jobs. Recently, 
however, with American unemployment on the rise and many Americans accusing 
Mexicans o f taking American jobs the border issue heated up. Senator Alan Simpson 
went even further when he introduced his immigration reform bill (IRCA) in 1982, 
saying that the illegals from Mexico "threatens to harm American values, traditions, 
institutions and . . . our way of life" (Tomar 1988, 197). Labor unions and liberal 
democrats, who saw undocumented workers destroying legal migrants’ opportunities, 
aligned themselves with the conservatives such as Simpson to support IRCA (Jack 
Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
Farmers, however, did their part to prevent IRCA’s implementation, insisting 
that if it were passed legalized immigrants would be able to look for year round and 
higher paying jobs. Even the state Departm ent of Agriculture chimed in, clarifying, 
"We’ve got two choices, either have an adequate supply of labor . . .  or allow growing 
fruit (to be produced in) other countries" (Durbin 1981, C l). Though activists also 
organized to defeat this bill because o f its discriminatory implications, it was to no avail.
In 1986 the Reagan administration pushed IRCA through. Once enacted, IRCA 
lost its usefulness to all but a few undocumented workers trying to become citizens.
IRCA both controlled the movement of the migrants and reduced their ability to acquire 
anything but farm work. IRCA also took the strain off o f the government to provide
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services for them. While the administration implied that this law was meant to provide a 
better life for the illegals, this was so for only a very few. Instead, IRCA effectively 
limited the number of illegals who could apply. Any migrants who had committed 
felonies or more than two misdemeanors, had received public assistance, o r had been 
deported and returned illegally were disqualified. Those who were eligible for temporary 
residence status had to prove their past year’s stay within a very short and strict time 
period. Extensive documentation, which was nearly impossible for migrants whose 
survival depended on hiding any evidence of existence, was also required. Family 
members of a worker who qualified had to wait up to ten years before they could 
become citizens, and visa permits would remain hard to acquire. The costly application 
procedure, which was extremely taxing on migrants, totalled $285 (Cowen 1987, A l). 
While only a very few were allowed temporary residency status, most of the rest lost 
their invisibility by applying.
IRCA also affected the social services available to illegals. Now, workers had to 
have documentation before any state o r federal agencies were allowed to aid them. 
Undocumented workers couldn’t even be told where jobs were available. Migrants who 
could have previously been housed were sleeping under bridges in Portland, in cars and 
in "worse-than-normal unsafe and unsanitary conditions." Families of newly documented 
workers remained here illegally. But, they could not obtain help from government 
services. O f the 3,800 migrants who applied for legal status in 1988, 41% were m arried 
(McCarthy 1990, B l). Multnomah County also experienced a rise of drug activity among 
workers who could no longer get winter work permits (Campillo 1990, B2; Jack Corbett, 
personal interview, 8 August 1990). INS representative, David Beebe clarified his stance 
on the predicament o f illegals:
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It’s a problem of their own creation. They have to be 
responsible for their own actions and obligations. We feel 
no responsibility for taking care o f them. . . . There are 
charitable organizations that may choose to help them, but 
that is not done at taxpayer expense (McCarthy 1990, B l).
Many families of legal status workers who continued to live in the U nited States
rem ained hidden and without support.
In some cases IRCA seemed to actually have the opposite effect it was intended 
to produce. Critics contended that it encouraged some employees to hire undocumented 
workers because they were cheap and, now with the threat of deportation, couldn’t 
complain.
Despite new "get tough" rhetoric, it became clear t h a t . . . 
the law may have actually created incentives to hire them .
. .  Many immigration attorneys claim IRCA has stripped 
migrants o f their rights, in turn creating a new class of 
immigrants so desperate for work that they will accept 
increasingly substandard wages and working conditions, 
since employers used IRCA as a means of withholding 
paychecks, denying vacations and refusing to pay minimum 
wages and overtime salaries (Tomar 1988, 196).
In Oregon mistreatment o f illegals by contractors was believed to have increased, 
encouraging clergy, health workers and legislators to unite and pass several bills in 1989 
to force contrac'.ois to provide for their workers (Campillo 1990, B2; McCarthy 1990a, 
B l). Federal and State officials estimated that 40% of the migrants coming into Oregon 
were still undocumented; many merely paid $500 to $800 for false documentation 
(McCarthy 1990a, B l).
While laws and aid reinforcing the power o f farmers was provided regularly, 
government provisions for the migrant were, on the whole, ineffective. Programs, when 
they were set in motion, lacked funding and therefore enforcement, and were so 
tem poraiy and superficial that they accomplished far less than they could have (Oregon
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Migrant Health Project 1969). During times o f dire need such as a bad harvest, inclement 
weather, o r early arrival o f far too many workers, a cry of panic would occasionally be 
heard, but most often it fell on deaf ears, already committed to the large farm lobby. 
Though there was concern at times, the issue o f who would pay for the migrants’ 
improvements always plagued any progress.
Laws that applied to farm labor were passed in 1939 and 1959, then revised in 
1969,1984 and 1989. Oregon statutes did cover sanitation, contractors, special school 
provisions, transportation and field conditions, but the state laws were less stringent than 
the federal ones and rarely enforced. The 1959 Farm Labor Codes "were at best, a poor 
compromise between what constituted good camp housing and sanitation and what the 
farmers and camp operators felt they could comply with at the time." The stronger 
federal standards in existence were finally adopted in 1969 (Oregon Migrant Health 
Project 1969, 24).
This lack of government protection left farmworkers excluded from the most 
protective worker law in the U.S., the National Labor Relations Act. Farmworkers 
remained without the right to bargain collectively, legally picket, gain the national 
minimum wage, or have the right to apply for workmen’s compensation, unemployment 
compensation, or public welfare. Nor were migrant workers protected by many child 
labor restrictions that were granted to other workers. In its effort to protect the farm 
owner the state government made sure farmworkers’ ability to strike was effectively 
limited with the anti-picketing law enacted in 1962. Legislation to protect the right to 
organize has yet to encompass the farmworker. Although something similiar to the 
NLRA arbitration, which covers all other workers, could help to neutralize the dominant 
position o f the owner, the U.S. and Oregon government continued to deny these basic
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rights. The Oregon legislature tried to enact an arbitration board in 1971. Its 
onesidedness caused Oregon AFL-CIO spokesman Ed Whelan to proclaim that it would 
have "stack[ed] all o f the cards against the agricultural worker" (Oregonian April 27,
1971, 2). Oregon politicians extended a farm picketing law in 1963 that restricted 
workers. Previously, anyone who had worked three or more days could legally picket the 
farmsite. In 1963 they extended it to require protesters to have worked 15 days at the 
same farm. This law was revoked by the state supreme court in 1990.
Until 1984 farmworkers were also the only occupational group not covered by 
federal sanitation standards. And, as with most other standards imposed, it took 
organized activists like the Migrant Legal Action Program to sue in 1987 for these 
OSHA regulations to adequately cover farmworkers in the field (Frisvold 1988, 885).
What was regulated was often detrimental to the migrant. Initially, 
Mexican-American migrants couldn’t get any aid under the 1939 Oregon Statute because 
they had to live in the state from one to three years. Migrants were not given many 
services allotted to other workers. Most were not covered by Social Security because 
they were required to work with the same employer for at least 20 days during the year 
and because their contractors didn’t file the paperwork. Employers who had a certain 
payroll or over 500 man days in any quarter were required to pay the minimum wage, 
but not overtime. Yet, migrants continued to pay taxes for services that they were 
unable to receive. That included illegal aliens working in Oregon who often paid taxes 
to avoid suspicion while still not receiving benefits (Cowen 1987b, D l).
Some restrictions prevented others from helping the migrants. Federal 
regulations prohibited private agencies dedicated to servicing the migrants like the 
Valley Migrant League from filing complaints about camps, allowing only those who had
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an employer-employee relationship to complain, which basically implied that the 
employer must turn him or herself in. In Oregon, even a contractor could not complain 
since often there was no written verification o f employment. The government did not 
prioritize the enforcement o f the few laws that did intend to protect the migrants. The 
legal system did not punish those who broke the few laws that were instituted to protect 
the migrant. When camp conditions were not met, camps were often either allowed to 
stay open or charged a nominal fee. When contractors were corrupt they were rarely 
prosecuted and when they were the punishment was unfairly lenient. In 1962 two 
contractors found guilty o f mistreatment were given the option to spend 60 days in jail 
o r leave the state immediately (Bianco 1962b, 27). This is in contrast to  the time and 
money the government spent to deport illegals after the season had ended (Gamboa 
1984, 150).
Migrants were occasionally helped when the government thought it would be 
m ore damaging for the sta te’s economy not to give help, or if  the conditions looked as 
though they would either cause a national emergency for the farmers o r create a food 
shortage. For instance, in the 1969 Governor’s Report, the government stressed the 
need for retraining o f the migrants as mechanization caused unemployment because 
otherwise the "welfare system will be burdened" (Kadera 1969, 6).
Although the government often did little for the migrants, it was capable of 
acting with speed. The government’s ability to respond quickly was seen during 
"Operation Harvest 1974," when a gas shortage threatened to reduce the labor force 
because o f long gas lines and high prices. The farmers, fearing a reduction o f workers 
from the Southwest willing or able to make the long trip, demanded immediate action 
from the government. Many agencies united, setting up 24 hour gas stations, maps in
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Spanish and English and providing recruitment services. Agencies involved included the 
Office o f Economic Opportunity, the Departm ent of Agriculture, the Departm ent of 
Labor, the Federal Energy Office and the Departm ent o f Health, Education and Welfare 
(Oregonian 9 April 1974, 2).
Although the government could move quickly when it felt it to be necessary, 
much of the time the government dragged its feet in aiding the migrants. Ex-migrant 
and activist, David Aguilar o f Chicano Cultural Centro expressed his frustration with this 
when he declared, "people in the state government are just trying to stall, hoping 
machines will replace the migrant before the state has to do something" (Oregonian, July 
7,1972, 24). Although it was certainly more complicated than this, action was slow when 
it occurred at all.
The response o f the government was instead limited to conducting studies.
Rarely were the recommendations followed. Several major studies of labor camps and 
housing were done: the 1958 Bureau o f Labor study, and the 1962, 1966 and 1969 
governor’s reports, conducted by the OSU extension service. What the earlier housing 
studies found were atrocious conditions for expensive rates estimated at up to 50% of 
the migrants’ wages (Infante and Current 1958, 20). Governor McCall’s study called for 
"immediate improvement o f migrant education, housing, health services, nutrition, 
working conditions and contractual arrangements" (Kadera 1969, 6). But, again, no 
further action was taken. Bills might be proposed to study the situation further or even 
change the laws but they rarely survived. For example, a Senate Joint Resolution in 
1957 was passed to study the corruption among contractors and House Bill 435 was 
proposed the same year to strengthen the law "so that they cannot dump workers after
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promising them certain periods o f work at an agreed rate of pay," but nothing ever came 
o f it (Oregonian, 14 May 1957, CI12).
While politicians often gave lip service to seeking improvements for the migrant, 
their voting record instead outlined support for the farmers and for their ability to 
acquire a cheap and steady supply of labor. For instance, when the Javits Bill, 
attempting to prevent youth under age 12 from working farms other than neighbor farms 
up to 25 miles from home came up in 1966, Oregon Senator Wayne M orse helped defeat 
it, claiming that it was "nonsense to suggest that Oregon children are being exploited" 
Instead, he claimed, farmwork was productive for children, saying, "it taught them more 
than their parents could teach them about the value and importance o f work"
(Oregonian, 27 August 1966, 8). Senators Wayne Morse and Mark Hatfield steadily 
supported the bracero program throughout its existence. Senator M orse declared his 
support stating, "American labor is not hurt one iota. The reason for this is that there 
isn’t an American worker who would do this type of stoop labor" (Oregonian, 3 
September 1963, 19). Hatfield said that the program helped Mexicans, U.S.-Mexican 
relations and was a deterrent to communism (Bianco 1964a, S13).
When funds were destined for aid to farmworkers, decisions as to how they 
would be spent were made at the top by people who were not familiar with the daily 
needs of the migrant. Because of this agencies’ programs were funded or cancelled 
regardless of progress made (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1971, 5).
New plans and progressive insights were created to solve the problem and then 
cancelled because of lack of funding. The new plan was implemented, and yet 
something else had to be cut, even if it was successful. Regardless o f the results o f a 
program, it could never be an ultimate success because it always lacked enough funding
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to fulfill the need. Though during the bracero program the government agreed with the 
Mexican government to a set wage and promised to prevent any discrimination against 
the braceros the government did not fund the enforcement o f these rules and so they 
were not followed. There were only two inexperienced Mexican inspectors for the whole 
Northwest, including Utah, Idaho and Montana, who were given their jobs because they 
were friends o f the Minister o f Labor (Gamboa 1984, 203). In 1970 the M igrant Health 
Project, the best program that had thus far existed for the migrants, was cancelled to 
make way for programs with that would follow a newly proposed idea "so that migrants 
could have the opportunity to make their own decisions regarding their own health 
problems." It was unclear how the Project had failed to do that except that it had not 
been created under this new banner (Migrant Health Project 1971, 5). Another example 
of the lack of funding affecting the implementation o f a program occurred under IRCA. 
While IRCA ordered that employers were to be fined or imprisoned on their second 
violation if they were caught knowingly hiring illegals, farmers had little to worry about 
since the INS’ budget was simultaneously cut in half that same year.
In 1987 an injury-from-pesticides system was instituted under the Health Division 
Office, ordered by the new federal standards. The system required employers to provide 
information and training on hazardous chemicals used in the workplace. But again, no 
effective means of enforcing it was used because of lack o f funds (Rosemary 1989, G2).
The funding war left local governments on the frontlines without state funds to
provide for local health care or other services, leaving those most capable empty-handed,
unable to handle the migrants’ most desperate needs. The 1971 Oregon Migrant Health
Project stressed that since there were few funds set aside
the small communities or counties will bear the financial 
loss. Local governments do not receive state funds to
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provide local health care services and their local ability to. 
finance such services does not meet even the need o f the 
residents, let alone the migrants (Oregon Migrant Health 
Project 1971, 5).
Funding was not the only problem. Most o f the actions o f the government were 
performed by separate agencies, uncoordinated and unorganized as a whole, leaving 
duplications o r huge holes in service. This lack of cohesiveness v 'aS seen early on. 
Because o f the decentralization o f  the Office o f Labor and the autonomy given to the 
state extension service during the importation of Mexican nationals, bracero contracts 
could easily be circumvented or ignored, with the distance between the braceros and the 
Mexican consulate making it nearly impossible for the Mexicans to even lodge a 
complaint (Gamboa 1984, 204).
In later years the same problem persisted. For example, although four state 
agencies inspected migrant housing, not one oversaw the efforts. In the case of 
overseeing the camps, the State Board of Health wrote the guidelines, the County 
Health departm ents notified camps of their lack of compliance, but the Bureau o f Labor 
had to be the one to close a camp down (Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 7). To 
organize the Migrant Health Project seven federal and state agencies and 14 local service 
organizations had to be unified {Migrant Health Project 1970-71). Funding for adult 
migrant education programs also functioned in this fashion, with the 1976 progarm 
requiring support from the State Welfare and Education departm ents, three school 
districts and three county welfare agencies (Lopez 1976, 29). A nother fine example of 
this division o f responsibilities, was the Bureau of Labor, which could regulate camp 
facilities for women and minor children but could not involve itself in matters relating to 
other workers {Oregonian, 14 May 1957, CI12). Though many times it was 
recommended that these separations should be mended, "no state agency has [gained]
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the responsibility of viewing the problems of seasonal agricultural workers in a general 
integrated basis" (Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 7).
This separation o f responsibilities had two consequences. First, agencies’ hands 
were tied, because they each had the ability to perform only one o f the many steps 
necessary to complete an action. If  these two agencies were not working together 
neither could complete the process. For instance, the Oregon Bureau o f Labor had the 
jurisdiction to put closure notices on farms, but the county sanitarians had to close them 
within 24 hours (Olmos 1964b, 24). This stopped even the most committed workers. 
Ismael Barrera, a Bureau o f Labor inspector voiced his frustration about this lack of 
cohesiveness in 1960: "When I see things like this I get angry. I get even angrier when I 
think that I’ve already told the county sanitarian about this and nothing has been done 
to correct it" (Olmos 1968a, 17).
The second consequence was that it encouraged departments to lobby and battle 
one another for the same money. Out o f desperation duplicate regulations drawn from 
different departm ents developed. These policies often conflicted, further confusing 
farmers as well as state agencies who, in turn, declared that they couldn’t follow 
government regulations because they didn’t know to which departm ent’s to adhere. One 
reporter wrote: "Growers contend they can’t upgrade their camps until the problem is 
resolved" (Oregonian, 7 July 1972, 24). Another farmer stated that "there are so many 
people involved in checking camps -- three or four agencies -- it’s become a m atter of 
politics" (Oregonian, 5 July 1970,14).
When concerned individuals working for a specific agency did decide to set forth 
programs to help in ways for which they saw a direct need, they were told they were out 
of the agency’s legal jurisdiction (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1970, 4). This
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immobilized government workers since many agencies would stop themselves from 
acting, fearing that they would be reprimanded for acting inappropiately. An example of 
this was the State Board o f Health, which in 1970 was attempting to revise some of the 
health standards for camps. They wanted to change the requirem ent for the number of 
toilets to include the children the migrants inevitably brought with them. But they didn’t 
"because the board decided it did not have the power to change the law on this point" 
(Floyd 1970, C3).
When departments and agencies weren’t battling each other they could plan on a 
battle with the very uncooperative farm bureaus. One account of this was in Marion 
county in 1970 when the local farm bureau wanted to be lax on the camp health 
regulations. It took the local health department, the Board o f Health and the Bureau of 
Labor, nudged by the Migrant Health Project, to finally assign a lawyer to notify them to 
get in compliance or have the camps they ran be closed down (Oregon Migrant Health 
Project 1970).
Another aspect of the programs kept them from improving the conditions for the 
migrants. Government programs and workers by and large failed to recognize cultural 
and community pressures which discouraged the migrants from using their services 
(Fitzgibbon 1990; Oregonian 23 May 1969; Swan 1990; Wentworth 1960). Mexicans, for 
instance, have a tradition called guela gueltza which promotes reciprocity and exchange of 
goods and assistance. Thus, they rely on each other for help and do not comprehend the 
government’s services because they feel they will ultimately owe back (Jack Corbett, 
personal interview, 8 August 1990).
Government officials and health and social service agents finally began to 
comprehend the cultural barriers that limited them. Police in Woodburn, Hillsboro and
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Portland as well as elsewhere only began in the late eighties to understand the 
importance of training their forces in Spanish and in cultural body language in order to 
reduce tensions between themselves and the Hispanic community (Coonrod 1985, B2; 
Ulrich 1984, C2). In 1990, Multnomah County employees urged the county to hire more 
Spanish-speaking and culturally sensitive personnel to work with the Hispanic inmates, 
who by 1990 occupied 20% of the jail beds in the spring months (Moore 1990b, E l) . In 
1990 Portland, at the request o f policeman Sheridan Grippen, also sponsored a class for 
government workers and police on the Spanish language and cultural awareness 
(Campillo 1990, B2). And in Washington County in 1990 approximately 80 personnel 
were trained in Spanish (Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
The lack o f trust or comprehension the migrants had for the government workers 
who tried to make contact with them seemed insurmountable. Migrants, at best, felt 
they could take care of themselves. At worst, they often feared that referrals for medical 
care were just ploys for more business for the physicians (Oregon Migrant Health Project 
1964-65, 8).
The government functioned on the assumption that if they provided a health 
service, announcing it in written form, then it was up to the individual to come and use 
it. Professor Joseph Gallegos, a researcher at the University o f Portland, expressed this 
assumption:
Historically, there has been an institutional lack of 
sensitivity to the needs o f minorities in the state. It was as 
though institutions said, ‘Our services are out there but it’s 
up to you to come to us’" (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
The effort to cross this barrier required tremendous spirit, initiative and careful 
thinking. This was accomplished by private, non-profit organizations. Health workers at 
El Nino Sano Health Clinic in Hood River, a nonprofit private agency functioning on a
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federal grant from the U.S. Bureau o f M aternal and Child Care, found that a two 
contact system was required to develop trust. The workers showed that trust could, with 
persistence, be established. They found that waiting for the migrants to come to them 
was a mistake. First, a Hispanic lay health worker would go out to visit and then the 
doctor would come. They also effectively connected with the migrant community by 
taking seven of the migrant women and training them as the contact health persons.
The doctor, Tina Castanares, who founded the project, was trained under the H ealth 
Facilitators, a national organization designed to train lay health workers to work in low 
income, rural areas. She in turn proceeded to instruct the seven o ther women, all of 
whom speak Spanish, with four speaking only that language (Stein 1990, LI).
Throughout this general state o f inaction some government workers and 
politicians repeatedly made concerted efforts. Those who stood out included Senator 
Don Willner, Representative Edith Green, State Senator M aurine Neuberger, State 
Representative and Chairman of the Kennedy Action Committee Vera Katz, and more 
recently State Representative Les Aucoin. They spoke out against the farm lobby and 
laws that were unfair, and on behalf of the migrants, recommending and proposing the 
implementation of funding for various services that would aid the migrants.
Representative Edith Green was the only Oregon delgate in 1963 to vote against the 
extension of the bracero program, claiming that while it hurt the family farm it 
disproportionately helped corporate farms (Franklin 1963, 22). When SB 406, the 
anti-picketing law, was on the floor to be extended in 1963 W illner opposed it, stating:
"It discriminates against the group in our society least able to protect themselves"
(Hughes 1963, 9).
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Willner, Katz, Aucoin and others joined marches and spoke at meetings. Some 
offered their expertise, such as Willner who provided legal counsel as a lawyer for the 
UFW  in 1967 ( Hearing Schedule, Commission on Agricultural W orkers 1 June 1990,1; 
Olmos 1967, C2). Government workers joined together in committees, pushing for 
stricter enforcement of farm and field codes, speaking on panels, or testifying about 
discrimination and tense community relations between police and Hispanics. These 
government representatives also promoted the development o f culturally sensitive and 
bilingual programs (Moore 1990a, C2; Pederman 1982, C2) They supported surveys and 
studies which allowed policies to be made (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1; M oore 1990a, C2).
The politicians spoke to the press to give support and information about the
conditions o f the migrants and the lack of protection the government provided. Willner,
in his concerted effort to push for minimum wages, unemployment insurance and
collective bargaining for the migrants, put it succinctly:
We are not really being fair so long as migrants are 
excluded from workmen’s compensation, unemployment 
conpensation, most o f public welfare, the state 
labor-management law and much of the minimum wage 
legislation (Oregonian, 29 January 1967, 24; Oregonian, 18 
March 1967, 21).
There is no doubt that the programs that were implemented, however temporary, 
sporadic or ineffective, can be credited to the sincere effort and dedicated work o f those 
few legislators who concerned themselves with the farmworkers.
The state and federal agencies most commonly involved in programs for the 
migrants included the State Departments of Agriculture, Education, Employment, Health, 
Labor, Welfare as well as the federal Workmen’s Compensation Board, the Office of 
Equal Opportunity, and the Farm ers’ Home Administration (Kirchmeier 1980, B3;
Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 10).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 1
A few special education programs and acts were developed by the government. 
Pilot summer school projects occurred sporadically in various locations, depending on the 
year. Vocational training and adult education were occasionally funded by the OEO and 
carried out by the Valley Migrant League (VML), a quasi-government agency (Guernsey 
1967; Olmos 1976; Sansregret 1983; Wentworth 1962). In 1966 California, Oregon and 
Washington united with the intention o f maintaining pocket-sized student records, 
containing grades, special needs, and ability levels.
Health and housing programs were sporadic at best. An average of 700 camps 
filed notices o f usage each year, but until the 1960s only a self-inspection system was used 
(iOregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 6). Even after an inspection system was in place the 
same relaxed attitude persisted, with a State Sanitation Division representative in 1984 
being quoted as saying: "The farmers know what the rules are and I think they comply 
with them" (Hogan 1984, Bl). Later when there were inspections, power was so scattered 
among the agencies and so little funding was provided that ineffectiveness persisted.
Only five percent of government inspectors’ time was spent the farm labor camps 
(Rural Tribune May 1978, 1). On the average only 25% of the farms were inspected each 
year. Statistics in 1970 bear witness to the lack of enforcement that occurred even when 
camps were inspected. Although 506 camps met the lenient standards when inspected 
315 did not. Of those 315,165 were still allowed to open (Oregon Migrant Health Project 
1971, 29). Between 1979 and 1984 no camps were inspected (Hogan 1984, B l).
Even when inspections were made, many farms with defects were allowed to stay 
open without fines or corrections made. The limited number of inspectors forced the 
government workers to be very superficial, as one set o f inspections in 1978 by OSPIRG 
showed, finding 66 violations compared to the 23 violations found by the state inspector
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(Lopez 1978, 25). Only a $100 fine and possible closure were the penalties for not 
complying with state regulations on housing. And, as OSPIRG stated, if the fines were 
not more than it costs to  correct the problem, then the fines were not going to be the 
incentive (Lopez 1978, 25).
The standards by which inspections were rated were very low. Farmworkers were 
the only occupational group that was not covered by the federal sanitation standards. 
After being challenged with lawsuits since 1972 by the national M igrant legal Action 
Program, twelve years later in 1984 the State W orkers’ Compensation D epartm ent’s 
Accident Prevention Division reported that it would begin a mandatory, scheduled 
inspection policy that would hit every camp in Oregon over a 3 year cycle (Frisvold 1988, 
885; Hogan 1984, Bl).
The OEO Migrant Health Project provided the best government funded health 
care the migrants would receive in Oregon. This project displays an overall view of the 
functionings of the government when it provided aid to the migrants. The M HP was an 
excellent example of the potential the government had to better the conditions of the 
migrants. A t the same time this project showed the inadequacies caused by the 
requirem ent for annual renewal of funding, the top-heavy decision-making and the lack of 
long-term planning ultimately caused by the lack o f funding (Oregon Migrant Health 
Project 1964-71).
As was the case here, aid was most often offered only through special programs. 
Projects were understaffed and temporary, creating immense inefficiency. Programs were 
given minimal power to make changes and cancelled if they tried to use regulations that 
were not being enforced. Resistence was met at every corner, and programs were 
cancelled just as they became effective. And, even with the committed staff that was
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acquired, ineffectiveness persisted because o f the lack o f cultural training provided to 
them {Oregon Migrant Health Project 1964-71).
The M HP lasted from 1963-1971. By 1970 the M HP serviced migrants in up to 
13 counties, where 90% of the migrants resided. It averaged about 18,000 patients a 
summer, equalling approximately 20-30% of the migrants, and provided home visits, 
physicals, m inor medicinal aid, referrals to partially funded doctors and pocket-sized 
health histories {Oregon Migrant Health Project 1970, 10). Cam p conditions, which the 
project at first did nothing bout, gave rise to the spreading o f disease and long recoveries. 
Lack o f heat, clean or hot water, modern toilet o r cooking facilities, combined with 
overcrowding and rodents, made it hard to keep things under control. Soon the M H P 
added sanitation checks to clean up the migrants’ environment.
The M H P was troubled with hiring and rehiring each spring, forced to begin anew 
each season as it regained its annual funding. As soon as the staff had gained the trust of 
the migrants, the season would be near its end, and, because o f the workload and low 
pay, most would not return the following season. The problem of gaining the trust o f the 
migrants proved enormous, especially since few of the workers spoke Spanish or 
understood the culture of the migrants.
Lack o f coordination among agencies also hurt the effort. Transportation costs, 
use o f  local clinics and extended services all had to be funded from different departm ents, 
and the time required to apply and receive the funds could be years later. The health 
workers, who became most familiar with the camp conditions, were repeatedly told that 
their concern for the effect the camps had on the health of the migrants was beyond their 
jurisdiction. When they insisted on more power and pushed through the inspections o f 
camps the whole project lost its funding. The government employees were told that they
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were performing functions out o f their jurisdiction. In effect, the most successful 
government program that provided services to the migrants was cancelled for essentially 
becoming more effective (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1971, 5).




Against the many odds, migrants and ex-migrants m aintained and developed 
support systems that allowed them to care for each other, retain their culture, and fight 
against the oppressive forces they encountered. Most importantly, Hispanic migrants’ 
familial, religious and cultural strength provided refuge. Over time this support has 
expanded in Oregon, centered in the small rural communities where many Chicanos have 
settled. Union activism also flowed out of this cultural and familial affiliation. This 
community spirit also produced activists among the ex-migrants committed to improving 
migrant conditions. As time progressed these Chicano activists directed Anglo activists, 
moving from purely religious guidance and charity to legal and legislative resistance and 
the creation o f self-help organizations.
Forced to respond to oppression by farmers, contractors, and local communities, 
migrants in Oregon banded together to protect each other. The continual changes of 
the seasons, its effect on crops and thus the amount o f labor needed, added to their 
distress and helped the migrants maintain a strong community and support system based 
primarily on the extended family to help them during hard times. This unification 
consistently remained the strongest form of resistance to outside forces the migrants had.
Though the conditions o f their living remained difficult, the migrants as a whole 
were able to sustain a higher level o f pride and independence than would be expected.
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They retained a strong sense of family, which included extended members, villagers, and 
long-time acquaintances. With the little money they made, many supported their 
families and friends, especially through hard times when work was scarce. Many 
regularly rem itted money to those family members left in Mexico or other Latin 
American countries (Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990). When lack of 
housing existed migrants were often taken in by others in an already overcrowded house, 
tent, trailer o r car (Lagra 1969, 40).
This strength o f community spirit and willingness to help each other kept them 
surviving under horrid conditions. A  fine example comes from a study of migrants in 
nearby Washington state. One migrant, Jorge Mena, gave a good steady job which he 
had held for four months to a friend who arrived from the Southwest because, "I did not 
have a alternative, I give to my friend my job because I can find me other job much 
faster than he" (Lagra 1969, 93).
The tremendous pride and desire for independence these migrants held led to a
general distrust o f others outside o f their community. A nurse from Portland’s Nurse
Practioners’ Community Health Clinic described this in one migrant family:
The Gomezes are independent. They don’t ask for help.
They want to do for themselves. They didn’t come right 
out and say they had these [health] needs, but they kept 
coming back with the same kinds of illnesses" (M cDermott 
1990, K l).
Another volunteer who interviewed elderly Hispanics in Portland told of one woman
living on $99 a month,
She was distressed but very proud. . . . There is a sense of 
suffering with dignity among many o f those I interviewed.
A sense that "We are poor but we can take care of 
ourselves" (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
87
Hispanics were successful in maintaining their religious and cultural traditions with this 
familial closeness, reinforced by constant movement and a rural environment. Studies 
have shown that they had a stronger sense o f culture and self-esteem than those who had 
settled out (Gecas 1973; Wells 1976).
CULTURE
The strength the Hispanic migrant families held lay in their deep cultural and 
religious roots. Each o f the twenty-three different Hispanic cultures found in Oregon 
has maintained its identity (Perschiera 1990, 4M EP1). Men gathered in associations 
according to the area or particular culture from which they come. This is especially true 
o f the Mexteca Indians who felt an affinity with each other. Their Benito Juarez 
Association is centered in Salem (Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
The m igrants’ expression of these cultures was reflected everywhere in their 
communities. Migrants regularly celebrated holidays such as el dia de las madres, made 
ethnic food, and, when possible, grew gardens full o f  jalapenos, cilantro, and tomatillos. 
Chickens, pigs, and other farm animals were kept when they were able to stay year 
round or winter in one location (Gamboa 1984,158).
Music and dance clubs were opened in many towns. During the bracero program 
men pooled the little money they could spare and bought jukeboxes, purchased or 
brought up Mexican records, gathered for dances and music, and rented nationalistic, 
pre-revolutionary films about rural heros which they showed in large tents on county 
fairgrounds (Gamboa 1973, 60). Tejano o r musica nortena, a combination o f south 
Texas, Mexican, and German bohemian could be heard (Gamboa 1973, 60). Many local
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bands played weekly throughout the state. Radio stations broadcast weekly and daily 
Hispanic music and news shows in Portland, Woodburn, Salem and Hillsboro.
Ex-migrants attempting to settle out congregated in small towns such as Nyssa, 
Cornelius, Woodburn and Gervais. Migrants, too, who worked in the outlying areas, 
gathered there in the summers. In these smaller towns Hispanics did not lose their 
community or culture as they would have in Portland (Gecas 1973; Gutierrez 1983;
Slatta 1975). In these towns with large Hispanic populations Chicanos have attempted 
to keep alive many traditional ways. Spanish signs and posters line the streets and 
businesses, and bakeries and restaurants serve Mexican and other Latino foods. In 
Woodburn the dance club posted its signs first in Spanish and then in English. Parking 
lots took the place o f the traditional Mexican plaza, with men gathering to socialize 
there (Martinis 1987, B2; Slatta 1979, 160).
In Woodburn, Nyssa, Cornelius and Gervais where, Hispanic culture was strong, 
the Chicano community struggled for power in city councils, pushing for more culturally 
sensitive school and policing policies. Though Chicanos remained under-represented in 
most political positions, even where a large percentage of the community is Hispanic, 
they did make progress (Hinkley and Olmos 1984, B7).
Despite the sustenance migrants gained from their culture, as this settled 
minority grew in population many remained voiceless and invisible. In 1964 the Oregon 
Migrant Health Project, a government agency working directly with migrants, noted 330 
Spanish-speaking farm labor families in Malheur County who had permanently settled, 
still working the fields and still quite poor. It stated, "some of these people have been in 
the area for 20 years and do not feel a part of the community" (Oregon Migrant Health
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Project 1964, 9). And in 1990, a health worker said: "They’re isolated and they’re lonely. 
. .  . They want to talk to someone" (Stein 1990, LI).
Religious faith helped the migrants survive their conditions. O f the 100,000 
Hispanics now residing in Oregon 71% were Catholic (Butterworth 1991, C l). Many 
were devout. Some recruited Catholic priests to say mass at 5:30 a.m. before they 
worked the fields or to perform such religious ceremonies as blessing a truck before they 
ventured the long journey to and from home (Gamboa 1973, 58; Kadera 1969, 6;
Martinis 1987, B2). Oregon Catholic dioceses with large Hispanic congregations have 
incorporated Hispanic religious ceremonies and began to say Masses in Spanish.
Hispanic migrants responded by attending Mass in great numbers. When migrants 
arrived in the spring, Catholic communities bulged. Ceremonies such as Mananitas, a 
traditional Christmas pageant, Los Posada a recreation o f Joseph and Mary’s search for 
lodging, as well as celebrations on Ash Wednesday, Good Friday and All Souls Day were 
included in the churches’ traditions (Blackmun 1990, 4M EP 8).
UNION ACTIVITY AND LABOR RESISTANCE
Labor unrest in Oregon among Hispanic migrant farmworkers expressed itself in 
the forms of camp vandalism, the refusal to work at particular locations, lack of 
cooperation with local police, violence and small strikes (Gambao 1984; Mazano 1987; 
Robertson 1969). As one migrant said, vandalism was "the migrant’s only way to leave a 
message, to ask for better housing" (Floyd 1968, 29).
Migrants also avoided areas where they had been previously m istreated for as 
long as they could afford. It was not uncommon to have a loss of labor for the next two
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seasons in an area due to low wages or bad conditions (Bianco 1958; Guernsey 1971; 
Infante and Current 1958; Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969).
The attem pt to unionize was dangerous and therefore naturally sporadic. After
the union activity o f  the 1930s and 1940s the Northwest farmers stepped up their efforts
through alliances to control labor unrest (Newbill 1977, 83).
Failure o f the International Workers o f the W orld in 
Yakima is easy to explain . .  . the wobblies could not hope 
to match strength with the farmers whose allies were many.
In addition to the chamber of commerce and local 
newspapers, farmers enjoyed the support o f city police, 
county sheriffs, state patrol and National Guard. These 
law-enforcement groups went well beyond what was 
necessary to maintain law and order (Newbill 1977, 83).
During the post-war period farmers had beaten unionism, and they were intent 
on net suffering through another bout of it. Even though they had the police force and 
political machine behind them, they knew the power and the trouble union activism 
could create (Austermann 1970; Guernsey 1971; Newbill 1977). Farmers turned to 
foreign labor, such as the Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexicans. This had proven 
useful before because foreign labor was isolated, desperate for jobs, and could be 
shipped out when the job was done. The use of braceros, and later illegal Mexicans, 
seemed to the farmers to make good sense (McWilliams 1939; Robertson 1969).
Even though the farmers used foreign labor in Oregon to quell the possibility of 
labor unrest, outbreaks o f dissent still occurred among the braceros. Gamboa found that 
during the bracero program the Northwest was a "hotbed o f labor unrest for over four 
years." The braceros struck because o f discrimination and the uncompromising attitude 
o f the farmers over conditions such as wages, food, or camps. The improvements that 
the farmers had to make to stop the rebellions were still far less than what was
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demanded by domestics during the thirties. And the braceros could be sent home at the 
end o f the season (Gamboa 1984, 345).
Many other factors further reduced the chance for unionism. W orkers were 
constantly on the move and had very little money, and thus it was hard for organizers to 
be financially supported or to get to the workers, who lived on private farms where 
farmers restricted their entrance (Lopez 1976; Olmos 1965; Penny 1957). In 1969 alone 
60 affidavits were filed in 20 weeks in an effort to force farmers to allow government 
workers onto the camps (Oregonian, 12 August 1969, 11).
The unions, unaided by membership dues, had financial troubles. They were 
forced to rely on donations from industrial unions, which, by and large, were either 
unreceptive to the conditions o f migrants o r unable to fund them when they were 
sympathetic because o f their own financial woes (Robertson 1969, 18). Although the 
industrial unions provided advice and support at times, essential financial support was 
not forthcoming.
Migrants usually distrusted anyone but their contractor and family, which added 
to the woes o f the already overburdened organizer (Robertson 1969, 5). Unfortunately 
these contractors did the work unions would have done, except that the benefits didn’t 
go to the workers. Divisions between full-time migrants and part-time farmworkers as 
well as racial or ethnic conflicts existed.
Those who saw farm labor as only part-time supplemental work, perceiving their 
stay in this kind o f labor as only temporary, could not afford to commit to sacrificing 
their daily wage for long term improvements. Furthermore, some farmers paid the 
migrants with a bonus for staying the whole time, in effect lowering the wage and then
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
92
making it up with a bonus, which meant that if workers struck they lost even more o f 
their income.
The sacrifices needed to battle the farmers proved too much for most.
Conditions remained so bad that despair often set in, with many holding the belief that 
change could not take root. Their poverty level also reduced their willingness to strike.
As had been seen in California, unionization was most feasible when there was a 
sense o f oneness, o f commonality, and that seemed to be most likely in areas where one 
crop was grown and where skills involved in farming were common among a large 
segment o f the labor force. Corporate farms in California had been easier to bargain 
with because they had a greater profit margin. Neither o f these conditions have been 
prominent in Oregon, where crops varied greatly and farms were relatively smaller 
(Robertson 1969, 20).
Strikes, the strongest tool for industrial unions, were largely ineffective in the 
struggle to organize farmworkers. During the 1960s and afterwards farmworkers found 
that when they struck they couldn’t control the entry o f large acreage farms and that 
consumers were often unwilling to boycott basic foods. Oregon laws left them 
unprotected since the NLRA did not cover them as it did other workers. Thus farmers 
were not legally required to allow or bargain with unions. Farmworkers were also not 
legally protected when they struck. Furthermore, the potential o f a food shortage 
allowed farmers to contend that striking was a national security issue, justifying the 
creation and implementation of an Oregon law which prevented picketing near farms.
This law remained until 1990 (Oregonian 27 April 1971, 2; Oregonian 5 March 1990, C5).
Strikes occurred regularly throughout the bracero program when they had a 
contract. Later migrants did not have a contract and were unable to rebel without grave
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repercussions. Although many migrants worked through a contractor the agreement was 
purely oral and usually covered only a place to work and live. These migrants of the 
1970s and 1980s merely had a chance for work under a contractor. While the braceros 
had guaranteed work, other migrants competed for their jobs. Mechanization increased 
the scarcity of jobs even more.
Regardless of the great odds, activists in the late 1960s continued to try to 
organize the farmworkers, with the UFW  leading the effort. They were encouraged by 
events in California. In 1959 the AFL-CIO Organizing Campaign of Agricultural 
Workers in California (AWOC) attempted to gather momentum, striking in 1965 in the 
grape fields of Delano, only to find that the farmers replaced them with braceros. Soon 
after, AW OC merged with the National Farm Worker Association to create the United 
Farm Workers. They then began a series of very successful consumer boycotts. The 
union was finally recognized by the farmers. Wages increased by 25% and some fringe 
benefits were included in a contract (Robertson 1969, 18).
Apparently, inspiration was gained from the California movement because during 
this same time resistance heightened in parts of Oregon. As early as 1961 discussions 
about joining up with the UFW occurred among the migrants. Different from the past, 
this new activism was led by migrants and ex-migrants rather than by activists outside of 
the field (Robertson 1969, 8).
In the late sixties, migrants and ex-migrants joined the UFW, no longer wanting 
the old, conservative charity organizations to continue the same way. They demanded 
that the Valley Migrant League, the largest non-profit agency acquiring funds from the 
government to aid the migrants, improve wages and permanent conditions instead of 
funding day care centers. The UFW and the local union VIVA tried to provide
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settlem ent aid, legal counseling, health care and career advancement. They understood 
that their effort must be to create a sense o f community to prepare Oregon for 
unionization (Olmos 1967; McNulty 1968; Robertson 1969). At this time they began the 
plan to set up cases which would allow them to fight the anti-picket law enacted in 1969. 
Their victory would be finalized 21 years later in 1990 when this law was declared 
unconstitutional (Oregonian 5 March 1990, C5).
Farmers feared what they saw as Chavez-inspired infiltrators and united against 
this activism (Austermann 1970; Guernsey 1971; Kadera 1970; Olmos 1969; Robertson 
1969). In 1971, farmers nearly succeeding in enacting Senate Bill 67, which would have 
forced one-way binding arbitration. Although this law was never enacted, it is valuable 
to observe to show the anti-union attitudes of farmers and politicians. The proposal was 
to hold elections early enough so that migrants couldn’t participate, allowing only 
perm anent employees to vote each year. It would have established wages and 
conditions, with a three member labor relations board appointed by the governor, who 
usually stood firmly on the farmers’ side. At least one represenative from the state 
Board o f Agriculture, another conservative force would be reserved a spot on this 
arbitration board.
S.B. 67 would have authorized farmers threatened by a strike or lockout to 
invoke fact finding procedures binding upon both parties if accepted by the farmer. The 
farmer would have had the sole right to reject the facts or call for as many new fact 
findings until the farmer was satisfied with one. Under this law workers would not have 
been able to strike until the facts had been accepted by the farmer, allowing the farmer 
to stall until the crop had been picked. This passed the senate. Finally, it was defeated
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after a rallying cry from industrial and farmworker unions, church groups and political 
activists put pressure on legislators (Oregonian 27 April 1971, C5).
In the late eighties one union was able to develop strength. The Pineros Y  
Campesinos Unidos Del Noroeste, the Northwest Tree Planters and Farmworkers U nited 
(PCUN), had the advantage of having members who were covered by federal 
reforestation laws that allowed them some security in minimum wages and conditions. 
PCUN originally grew out o f community service dealing with raids and deportations in 
the early eighties. They continued to expand their efforts to all farmworkers and also 
became active on the political and legislative scene. Presently, 65% o f the union 
members are settled Oregonians in the Willamette Valley.
PCUN’s successes offered encouragement. This union united the workers against 
IRCA, helping to reduce its destructive nature before it was enacted. In 1990 they won 
a suit against Governor Goldschmidt and the state of Oregon striking down the 1962 
Oregon statute that prohibited picketing at Oregon farmlands (Oregonian 5 March 1990, 
C5). In 1990 they also won a case against radio station KBEY located in W oodburn 
when a Spanish music and news program funded by the union was cancelled for 
describing a conflict with growers. Although the owner o f the station claimed it was 
anti-grower in nature the courts found this to be illegal. The court decision declared 
that the owner must allow the show back on his station (Oregonian 27 July 1990, A23).
Union members gained the support o f the UFW and Cesar Chavez, who toured 
through Oregon with them. They also have been aided by the AFL-CIO in their battle 
against the anti-picketing law. Its membership has risen from 400 in 1986 to over 2,700 
in 1990 (McCarthy 1990a, B l; Oregonian 5 March 1990, C5).
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One reason PCUN was initially able to survive and unify farmworkers was 
because o f the protection of the federal regulations under the deforestation legislation 
which covered some of its members. The deforestation legislation provided for a 
minimum wage and the right to organize (Kirchmeier 1980, B3). PCUN also aimed its 
membership drive towards Mexican and other Latin American migrants who had come 
from areas of political activism and had received amnesty under the new legislation.
PCUN organizers had another advantage. They gained the trust o f their fellow 
workers because they lived and worked among them. PCUN was organized and led by 
Hispanic migrants, most of whom came from Latin America and spoke Spanish as their 
first language. They were able to use the loyalty that existed among themselves to 
empower the union. They functioned as a family, very cautiously screening whom they 
allowed into their ranks. This cohesiveness was reinforced by the history o f government 
and farmer harassment they had experienced in Oregon as well as in their previous 
homelands. Suspicion extended even to sympathetic Chicanos, who were at times seen 
as anglicized (Francisco J. Rangel, personal interview, 5 July 1990).
PCUN was able to usurp the contractors’ role on some farms because the 
farmers have seen them as more reliable and as a fair deal. Most recently, president 
Cipriano Ferrel and the union began organizing to start a pesticide assistance program 
to help enforce safety regulations in the field with the help o f the Northwest Coalition 
for Alternatives to Pesticides (Rosemary 1989, G2).
The problems that farmworker unionism confronted led PCUN, along with other 
activists and migrants, to seek solutions in legislation. Future legislation to protect the 
migrant and prevent the use o f illegals was seen as essential. They wanted to eliminate 
the farm ers’ constant use of illegals for strikebreaking and for lowering the wage.
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Historically, an important tool for improving conditions for migrants has been the 
legal system. Suits have been brought against the farmers and powers that be to 
improve conditions and wages as well as to stop the mistreatment, violence and 
dishonesty o f the employers and the police force. Suits in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
were brought against farmers to stop them from preventing activists and government 
health officials from entering the camps when the migrants requested help (Bustos 1969; 
Cowley 1970; Floyd 1969; Kadera 1969; Mayer 1983; Olmos 1982; Oregonian 18 March 
1969; Pederman 1982, Stewart 1982 Wentworth 1960). In the 1970s the first successful 
class action suit brought by migrants against farmers for breach of contract was filed. In 
this case 8 residents of New Mexico paid $2,000 for a lawyer to demand the $8,000 owed 
them by the Tankersley farm (Oregonian 14 December 1971, 12; Rural Tribune 
September 1978, 1).
In 1983 Hispanics demanded that a committee be formed to deal with the 
tensions and mistreatment o f migrants in Oregon. An incident during the suit o f  the 
farmer who had assaulted a worker over a wage dispute was used as leverage. In order 
to testify in this case several migrants returned from Los Angeles, having spent their own 
money to return. They could afford only to stay a short while. Just after they arrived, 
the defense attorney requested to postpone testimony of the preliminary hearing in.
This was seen as a tactical move to prevent the arriving migrants from testifying. This 
blatant attempt to limit the ability for the migrants to give testimony and the 
immigration raids that had been occurring regularly led to the development of a 
conciliation board established by the U.S. Department of Justice to review the treatm ent 
migrants received within the judicial system (Hilderbrand 1983, B3).
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As stated before, the Tree Planters’ Union sued the state o f Oregon and its 
governor for the use of the picketing law enacted in 1963, which they claimed was a 
violation o f freedom of speech. That law was found unconstitutional in 1990. The effect 
of lawsuits like these were invaluable to the migrants. The actions o f PCUN and the 
help of activists in and outside the Hispanic community advanced the rights and 
protection of migrants in Oregon.
ACTIVISM
Activists provided what the migrants’ own community could not. They 
understood the workings o f the government and knew how to voice the needs of the 
migrants. Where the government or farmer left gaps these volunteer groups rushed to 
fill the holes, a process much like digging from here to China. They pressured the 
government and tried to check the power o f the farmers. They marched on Salem in 
1968 demanding better conditions, lobbied for better laws and services, set up day care 
centers, vocational training, credit unions and information centers, and chaired 
workshops and advisory committees. They charted the direction for aid and support, 
protection and advocacy.
In the 1950s and 1960s Anglo religious volunteers dominated this area. Later, as 
Chicanos settled in Oregon, they became activists for their community and for their own 
people, which included the migrants. These Chicano activists, included among them 
ex-migrants or children of ex-migrants, paved the way for a new self-sufficiency and 
cultural movement. They provided essential resources for the few migrants who have 
been able to settle, helping those in poverty struggle to survive a little easier. They 
sponsored newspapers, radio stations and programs and television shows. Some
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campaigned for representatives of la raza for city council positions or county seats, 
providing a further sense o f community and support for migrants far from home. Those 
Chicanos in Oregon in positions o f power brought migrant concerns to  the courts, the 
press and to the city and government.
Examples o f Chicanos who have made the condition o f all Chicanos their 
business through activism are numerous. Ismael Barrera, the first Chicano to be hired 
as a Bureau o f Labor inspector, regularly risked his career by protesting the conditions 
of the camps (Olmos 1969, 24). Ex-migrant Daniel Santos, president o f The Political 
Action Committee united successful Chicanos to lobby in Salem. His ability to acquire 
donations for this fight proved invaluable as weii (Olmos 1983a, MW D2). Jose Salano, 
director o f migrant education for Washington County followed the course his parents set 
for him. When he was young he was kicked out of school when his parents inquired 
about his education. Now he watches the education system to be sure migrant students 
are adequately served (Olmos 1983b, MW B l).
David Loera, another Hispanic runs Mano a Mano, a Salem based non-profit 
service organization committed to providing unemployed migrants with essentials. Joseph 
Gallegos, a University of Portland professor, also an ex-migrant, co-founded the now 
defunct Collegio Cesar Chavez at Mt. Angel. M ore recently he committed himself to 
research which will help migrants gain access to public resources. He reflected on his 
studies, used to provide documentation of the needs o f elderly Hispanics in Oregon: "It 
shows how an academic institution can be actively involved in the community. I honestly 
think it’s our responsibility to be directing projects like this" (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
Anglo activists needed their Chicano peers to act as liaisons. Migrants were 
extremely reluctant to receive aid from anyone, volunteer o r government, Anglo or
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Hispanic. Many factors reinforced this hesitancy. They did not know or trust most of 
these people. The migrants, from past experience, feared the "something for nothing" 
service, constantly suspecting that someone was trying to trick them. Frank Ojeda, an 
ex-migrant stated the sentiment well: "We have been used too much, been promised too 
much" (Floyd 1968, 29). This was heightened by the fact that many could not read 
pamphlets given to them by volunteers describing services offered. O ther migrants 
feared authorities, especially the government which played a dual role of helping them 
and deporting them. Those who were born or lived previously in Latin America may 
have found their own country’s authorities untrustworthy, and naturally acted with 
caution. Migrants also had a tradition of pride and independence, encouraging them to 
rely on themselves for their needs (Lagra 1969; Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969). 
Chicano activists could sometimes break the barriers, establishing trust.
Many activists also confronted another barrier. They lacked knowledge o f the
Hispanic language and culture. Activists and government health workers tended to see
the Hispanic belief system as superstitious or invalid. The following 1969 account of the
medicinal belief and ritual system of the migrants shows the complexity o f the situation.
One health worker described just one important aspect called mal de ojo:
Apparently when we admire something about another 
person, we, in effect, put a hex on them. The child will 
become ill with elevated temperature, vomiting, sometimes 
convulsions, unless the person doing the admiring cancels 
out the "hex" by touching or holding the admiree! The 
nurses and the aids learned to touch any child about whom 
they were discussing, if possible (Oregon Migrant Health 
Project 1969, 181).
Chicano activists also often played the role of guiding other activists to cultural 
sensitivity.
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Obviously Hispanic activists could break through this wall far easier than others. 
As ex-migrant health worker Irma DeAnda from El Nino Sano Clinic in Hood River 
said: "They receive us because we are brown faces. We speak their language. We 
explain things to them" (Stein 1990, LI).
Though most of the organizations’ activists set up in Oregon were non-sectarian 
their staffing was often filled with religious activists who held strong beliefs. These 
Oregon activists, like others around the nation, sought to provide the basics so that 
individuals could strive spiritually instead of being obsessed with survival (Oregon State 
Bureau o f Labor 1959; Ruether 1970; White and Hopkins 1976). Both the 1958 report 
of the Migrant Ministry and the direction of leading activists today point out this 
intention (Freedman 1989; Marx 1989; Oregon State Bureau of Labor 1959).
Though Protestant activists were prominent in social service agencies in Oregon 
that worked for the Hispanic migrants, because of the religious convictions o f most 
Hispanic migrants, Catholic activists functioned in a more intimate way within the 
migrant community. Catholic priests lived among them and Catholic Chicano activists 
knew them, spoke their language, understood their culture and were more often trusted 
(Blackmun 1990; Cockle 1990; Freedman 1989; Oregonian 23 June 1964). This daily 
commitment helped to create communities of activism located in Woodburn, Cornelius, 
Dayton, Nyssa, and other small rural towns where migrants stayed or worked nearby.
A transformation in the direction of many of Oregon’s religious activists occurred 
after the 1960s. Through their trials and tribulations Christian activists in Oregon have 
gained a stronger conviction and clarity of purpose since the 1950s. Many moved from 
part-time charity to direct and constant involvement at the community level. Some also 
moved away from direct church involvement because their convictions were more radical
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than the churches could tolerate (Marx 1989, 1). They became politically active after 
living among o r seeing the conditions of the migrants. These later activists sought to 
change migrant conditions, desiring to help more than the spiritual needs o f the migrants 
to which the Migrant Ministry o f the 1950s and 1960s had confined itself (Austermann 
1970; Freedm an 1989; Marx 1987).
A  new national Catholic movement strengthened Oregon Catholic activists and 
clergy. Their purpose was to "give the people hope, to educate people in how the system 
works so they can confront that system with their power" (Jones 1987, 9). They believed 
that the oppressed in the United States were worse off than the oppressed in Latin 
American because the poor had no hope or faith in the chance for liberation (McCarthy 
1988, 19). In San Antonio, Virgilio Elisondo, religious leader and director o f the San 
Antonio Cultural Center, expressed this new faith in his "Galilean principle" which 
proposed that Mexican-Americans and other marginal peoples in the United States could 
and must, through their pain and rebirth, help others create a new society (Shaull 1984, 
99).
Their philosophy included providing encouragement and faith because "so many 
of the poor are so angry, so broken, so inhumanly discouraged and desouled" (McCarthy 
1988, 17). These Christian communities developed a strong grassroots emphasis, with 
self-sufficiency for the downtrodden as their main goal (McCarthy 1988, 18).
Jose Jaime, David Zegar and Rodney Page exemplified the religious leadership 
of this activism in Oregon. Jose Jaime, one of the founding members o f El Centro 
Cultural in W oodburn, was particularly representative of Chicano activism and o f the the 
Catholic grassroots community activism.
Page, a middle-class Protestant, attended seminary, worked in several low-income
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communities, arriving in California in the late 1950s to work with the migrant farm 
community under the M igrant Ministries. He described his experience there as a turning 
point:
To see kids with arms twisted out o f shape because they’d 
been broken and left untreated, to see such grinding 
poverty in the camps, the kids drowning in irrigation 
ditches-it was the most earth shaking experience in my 
life. I became sensitized forever to the social issues o f  our 
time (Marx 1989, 9).
Page later established the Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon, which now 
encompasses 17 denominations and over 2,000 congregations (Marx 1989, 8). While 
EM O provided daily services throughout the state, its real power lay in using its prestige 
to lobby for those in need.
Jose Jaime, born and raised in Mexico, was sent to the states to be educated and 
ordained. After.vards Jaim e taught migrants at Mt. Angel. Later, one suspects, in order 
to work more directly with his community, Jaime left the priesthood to work and live as 
a lay person, and his "commitment to living in the religious community began to take a 
different perspective." Jaime attempted to unite the Hispanic and Anglo forces. His 
words reflect the new Catholic activism, "I still strive to feed my faith with their faith" 
(Freedman 1989, 1).
The Reverand Zegar of St. Alexander’ in Cornelius represented a new breed of 
Catholic Anglo priests. These few priests were extremely committed to their Hispanic 
congregations. They were usually bilingual and familiar with various Hispanic cultures. 
Zegar fought for migrants in the workplace, the legal system, in social services agencies, 
and in the legislature. He helped pass two bills in 1989 which strengthened the footing 
o f the migrants. One requires contractors to provide for migrants when they are brought 
up before work is available and the other bill gives migrants better access to social
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service agencies. As vicar for the Hispanic Ministries for the Catholic Archdiocese o f 
Portland, Zegar made sure that priests serving in Hispanic communities were equipped 
to  provide for the Hispanic community they work in (Butterworth 1991, C l).
Alongside the religious activists in Oregon there stood sectarians who felt that 
these migrants deserved better treatm ent and a stronger representation, and so they 
cried out as the voice o f the oppressed, lobbying for government money and new state 
labor and housing regulations, successfully increasing funds and drawing attention to the 
treatm ent o f migrants (Cargill 1984; Guernsey 1971; Hill 1982; Oregonian 20 July 1958).
CHRONOLOGY O F OREGON ACTIVISM IN TH E M IGRANT COM MUNITY
Volunteers, both political and religious have been actively aiding Hispanic 
migrants since the 1950s in Oregon. These activists, many religious, began in the 1950s 
to organize themselves and, with a small fund, 30 seasonal staff and 300 lay workers, 
they set up health clinics, organized recreational activities, offered religious services and 
funded a priest to come from Mexico (Olmos 1964, CIO). In 1955 the Oregon Council 
o f Churches sounded the first organized statewide concern (Slatta 1979, 31). Meanwhile, 
in 1955 The Migrant Ministry, sponsored by the Portland Archdiocese, was set up to 
research and provide, at this point, purely spiritual guidance for the migrants 
(Austermann 1970, 31).
In their 1955 report the Migrant Ministry clarified its position, documenting that 
their members were only there to conduct research and provide religious services, not 
change conditions. Previously the Migrant Ministry had worked in California, and 
possibly they understood the dangers o f crossing the farmers or even appearing to be 
doing so. However, it is also possible that initially they were not concerned with altering
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the farm or work conditions of the migrants, since some of them may have been the 
wives of the farmers who hired these workers (Austermann 1970; Migrant Ministry Report 
1955).
The Migrant Ministry found college students from Linfield College, University of 
Portland and Pacific University to live year-round in the camps and to organize picnics, 
sewing circles, fiestas. They set up nurseries for the children while the parents worked 
{Migrant Ministry Report 1955). They also hired priests to come up from Mexico to serve 
the migrants. Father Bravo, from Zamora, Michoacan, Mexico had been sent yearly 
since 1952. His services represented the purely spiritual direction the MM promoted. In
1964 Father Bravo served 642 families, 192 single men, saying 353 First Co nr -.r.vnions, 49 
marriages, 25 baptisms, 173 confirmations, and tutored catechism to 642 children (Olmos 
1964, CIO).
In 1964 the Migrant Ministry, later named the Oregon Friends o f the Migrants, 
started the Valley Migrant League (VML), which successfully monopolized government 
resources throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It was at this time that the "second organized 
major manifestation of concern" occurred when legislators, clergymen, labor contractors, 
and citizens came together to apply for an OEO "demo grant" to fund adult education, 
summer school, day care, and health programs (Slatta 1979, 161). This initial grant sent 
80 VISTA volunteers and nearly $700,000 to Oregon (Schulz 1965,10). This grant was 
the first of many. Lobbying annually for relatively large sums of federal money under 
the O E O ’s "war against poverty," the VML ran VISTA, the Migrant Health Project and 
most summer education programs.
This was a united effort by some of the religious volunteers and the farmers. In
1965 the VML had 12 growers on its 40 member board of directors (Olmos 1965, 26). It
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served the purposes of both groups: The farmers could influence the government to 
fund the improvements needed instead o f paying for these themselves while the religious 
activists got the improvements they felt the migrants desparately needed. The VML 
existed as a non-conflict, friendly, quasi-government agency which gained a lot o f power. 
It used its money in non-controversial ways, and lost few supporters among those in 
power. As one priest said in 1964 about a health grant that the VML acquired: "The 
program will help growers because it will offer advantages to migrant workers and will 
be an inducement for them to come to Oregon this summer" (Schulz 1965, 10).
Because o f the VML’s superficial goals and the annual cycle of grants that 
needed to be renewed, these programs remained temporary and caused a high turnover 
o f staff, further reducing any significant or permanent improvements. As the VML 
grew, it also became consumed with governmental regulations connected to its funding, 
losing much of its creative initiative (Floyd 1969, 29).
Meanwhile, the direction of some of these religious and political activists within
the VML continued to change. The difference between the stated goals of the Migrant
Ministry written in the late fifties, and the actions of some religious activists in Klamath
Falls in the 1970s expressed this change. The Migrant Ministry Report purposely clarified
its intent to help only the spiritual needs of the farmworkers. In 1970 the chairman of
the potato grower’s league stated the increasing division between the farmers and the
local church council in Klamath Falls when the Growers League ordered the volunteers
off o f their farms for political activity. In this later confrontation the league told its old
ally that they were no longer welcome in the farmer-built community hall, complaining
that the Council o f Churches representative,
. . . caused us quite a bit o f trouble and was just not good 
for us. We had adverse reports from people in the camps,
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farmers, a county health officer and others. . . .  W e’ve 
never been happy with the Council o f Churches. It has 
seemed more interested in bettering the laborers’ social 
standards than their religious needs (Austermann 1970, 31;
Migrant Ministry Report 1959, 4).
As these activists sustained their efforts over the years they realized that little 
seemed to change. The existing statutes were not as strong even as the federal 
regulations, and government funding and commitment to  enforcement rem ained low, 
allowing for continued mistreatment o f migrants. In the sixties and seventies churches 
and activists united to enter the political arena, lobbying for stiffer Oregon statutes and 
federal grants to protect migrants.
By the late sixties action mounted. In May of 1967 the Poor People’s M arch on 
Salem for 1968 was planned to grieve to Governor Tom McCall for better housing in 
labor camps, for state codes to be enforced on showers, fresh water and toilet facilities, 
to have crew leaders licensed as contractors, to stop contractors from busing workers 
long distances in overcrowded and ill-equiped buses and to push for the NLRA to begin 
covering farmworkers. The march was also a protest against farmers’ continual refusal 
to allow activists onto the camps located on farmers’ property. Participants included the 
National Council of Churches, VIVA, VOCAL, UFW of Oregon, the AFL-CIO and 
local church groups throughout the state (Olmos 1968b, 17; Oregonian 29 January 1967, 
24). The march led to some revised legislation (Olmos 1968b, 27).
As pressure was levied on the government to enforce old laws and health officials 
leaned on the growers to improve conditions, opposition by the farmers began to  rise as 
well. Farmers, backed by their labor contractors and guards, began to leave the 
volunteer organizations, continuing to force the religious organizers off their premises, 
locking their gates which surrounded the homes of migrants, and intimidating workers
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into silence. As this change occurred conflicts between the bureaucratic charity agencies 
and the more radical activists arose (Kadera 1969, 6).
As the battle pressed on, turmoil rose from within these organizations as well. A  
stronger spirit awakened and persisted as Hispanic migrant workers who had climbed out 
of this labor, backed by concerned citizens and others, became involved, demanding a 
voice in their own lives and those o f their people. It became obvious that a bureaucratic 
organization with some questionable motives had mushroomed and that those who made 
decisions were not and had never been migrants. The ex-migrants pointed out that 
theirs was a different culture and experience and that they best understood the migrants’ 
needs and concerns. Ex-migrants and children o f ex-migrants established the Collegio 
Cesar Chavez at Mt. Angel to begin the process of self-education among la raza. These 
younger activists began to see the VML as maintaining the system instead o f changing it. 
At one UFW  meeting in 1969 this sentiment was expressed. The ex-migrants were not 
enthusiastic about a VML grant for nurseries, instead wishing to direct the effort to 
improving wages, "so they could hire their own babysitters" (McNulty 1968, 13).
Many were tired o f the charity-oriented, top-heavy hierarchy which kept activism 
confined. A 1957 account in the Portland Oregonian tells of the limitations the charity 
organizations instituted. A Red Cross disaster representative had been reprim anded for 
helping migrants in need. He had entered a Gresham farm to provide food and 
transportation for 200 farmworkers who were tricked into coming up in a year when 
there was already a large surplus of labor. After one worker complained to the county 
sheriff, the workers had been evicted and left stranded in a hard rain on the roadside. 
When the Red Cross worker drove them to the Portland Hotel, a homeless shelter, the 
farmer claimed he had trespassed and the Red Cross officials reprimanded him. He,
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like other activists during this and later times, felt as though the organization had failed 
him, and quit after 10 years o f serving as a disaster representative (Penny 1957, 18).
As ex-migrants and more militant members within the VML raised their voices 
they were checked. At first the VML accepted bits and pieces o f these demands, hiring 
more Hispanics at lower levels until by 1968 15% o f the VML were ex-migrants. "In 
most o f the VML’s opportunity centers throughout the W illamette Valley, however, non­
farmworkers continue to hold the operational reins as the transition takes place" (Olmos 
1968b, 17). More tension rose as several employees told the press that they were forced 
to sign agreements that forced them to not involve themselves in UFW  activities 
(McNulty 1968, 13).
Then in 1969 the VML funded the Farm Workers Home (FHF), a self-help 
organization which the VML allowed to run at the grassroots level. But the FH F had 
very little real decision-making power. Almost no top positions were held by 
ex-migrants. Neither were there any ex-migrants or Chicanos on the VML board 
(Olmos 1968b, 17).
Pressure ran high, tensions mounted, the Home struggled with its new-found 
power for nine months and than collapsed in conflict. The ex-migrants failed miserably 
at their first attempt to run a program. Lack of decision-making and resolution skills 
hindered the ex-migrants and mere lip-service support on the part o f the VML led to 
internal battles. The press ran a story o f a fight that broke out at one o f the Farm 
Worker Home Board meetings between a VIVA member and a Farm W orker Home 
member (Kadera 1969, 6). In response, the VML withdrew funding, tightening its grip 
and justifying its top-heavy procedures.
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At a UFW  meeting in the Willamette Valley in which Senator Willner 
volunteered his legal services for the union, one ex-VML member proclaimed the 
sentiments o f many Chicano activists: "We want to help ourselves and be treated as 
equals." As another one stated: "We feel we understand our problems and we can find 
jobs ourselves, providing we get help from industry" (Olmos 1969, 24). Tension between 
the conservative, charity-oriented volunteers and the ex-migrants continued. Senator 
Willner stressed that if it was not resolved, "the migrants will be the losers" {Oregonian 
January 29, 1967, 24). An important process of self-determination had began.
The term s of employment at the VML continued to force employees to sign 
agreements not to work for the UFW. This was the last straw that broke the camel’s 
back, and many quit (Kadera 1969, 6) Consequently, as VML chose to keep its funding, 
its more radical members left, setting up VIVA and VOCAL.
VIVA (Volunteers in Vanguard Acton), VOCAL (Volunteer Oregon Citizens for 
Agricultural Labor), the United Farm Workers o f Oregon and the Campensinos Forum 
tried to organize. These groups had more of a self-help attitude and a stronger desire to 
radically change the economic system. Efforts were also made to set up a cooperative 
credit union "in which farm laborers could invest part of their earnings" (Olmos 1967,
C2). These o ther groups’ power also depended on government funding and its political 
expectations, and most of that funding had already been taken up annually by the VML, 
which by now was extremely efficient in acquiring grants (Bustos 1969, 137; Kadera 1969, 
6).
Similar battles were being fought elsewhere in the state by Chicano and other 
activists. Some hired on for OEO projects in the late sixties in Nyssa came into conflict 
with the existing institutions which ran these programs. Activists were working under an
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OEO migrant education project at Treasure Valley Community College. The
educational content they were teaching perhaps included some spirited lessons about
fighting back for what they felt the migrants deserved. The TVCC administrators
reacted with fear; they wanted to maintain a clear division between political philosophies
and government services, not seeing that their own perspective was based on a different,
equally molded, political agenda. Several of these Chicano activists were fired, with the
head of the TVCC claiming that these "outside radicals," supported by Cesar Chavez,
were instigating the migrants. Later, after the press took hold o f the story, the fired
were reinstated, with a local Chicano activist of Nyssa replying,
It won't be called or led by Cesar Chavez and his people.
He has all he can do in California. The people involved 
and in command will be the Mexican-Americans from right 
here (Guernsey 1971, 1).
The drive towards independence would not be easily forthcoming or painless.
Even within the Chicano contingent some activists supported working within the system 
while others chided those "coconuts," brown on the outside, white on the inside, for 
selling out (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 114). They preferred to maintain their cultural 
identity, and wanted their pride back. The feeling existed that those "other" volunteers 
were part of the system that had gotten Chicanos and migrants in this mess in the first 
place and that the whole system needed changing, a concept the VML could not accept. 
The need for the ex-migrants to learn how to hold and use their own decision-making 
power was at hand. And it seemed as if there were no stopping this process of 
empowerment.
The division of the Salud Medical Clinic and the Virginia Garcia Memorial Clinic 
in Woodburn was an example of this conflict. The 1979 separation stemmed from 
political differences over the lack o f control the Chicano representatives had in Salud.
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As well, they felt that Salud did not let them make their own decisions since Salud held 
the monetary strings (Rural Tribune February 1979, 1).
Throughout the state many religious and political activists moved away from the 
VML, joining to support what those in la raza were doing. Now, when a farm er refused 
to let a volunteer on the farm to see a migrant who had requested help, instead o f just 
walking away as in the past, that volunteer would be more likely to go through the legal 
system. In 1969 alone sixty affidavits were filed contesting the refusal to allow 
volunteers to enter farms where the migrants lived (Guernsey 1971, 1).
On a larger scale, the National Council of Churches and other grassroots 
organizations united and protested. This time their voice was beginning to be heard. 
Ultimately, their efforts led to the ending o f the bracero program. As well, in 1969 
Oregon governor Vic Atiyeh set up an Advisory Committee on Chicano Affairs to 
monitor state laws and programs affecting Hispanics. Even though this committee had 
no real power it symbolized the response of the government to this new force (Slatta 
1979, 161).
Since the 1970s grassroots groups more inclined to take risks have taken a front 
seat to the old non-political charity-oriented organizations run by wealthy donors. The 
new volunteer agencies were led by leadership which had more direct hands-on 
experience. Decisions were made with less top-heavy control, and fewer of the "bosses” 
(farmers, landowners) to run these agencies. Hispanics, ex-migrants, the sons and 
daughters o f ex-migrants, religious, and political activists were the new organizers. They 
replaced the old top-heavy style of decision-making which farmers and wealthy 
do-gooders controlled. One example of this is the Portland based W omen’s Foundation 
of Oregon whose rules required that at least 51% of the board represent its target
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group. One o f its programs attempted to help Guatemalan migrants become 
self-sufficient by helping them to establish markets in which the women sold and profited 
from their own handwoven fabrics (Dettman 1990, N2).
This new kind o f organization dedicated to helping the migrant become 
self-sufficient flourished in the Chicano community, located in Woodburn and Gervais, 
where the effects have been spellbinding. The House of Zion, El Centro Cultural, the 
Salud Medical Clinic, and El Aguila Federal Credit Union along with other community 
agencies helped Hispanics to maintain their own culture as well as speak out against 
mistreatment (Cargill 1984, Bl; Cowen 1986a, B l; Durbin 1981, C l).
El Centro Cultural exemplified this new concept of self-help and cultural 
independence. El Centro was founded in Washington County in 1972 by twelve 
immigrant families who had experienced the people’s problems first hand. They 
originally called themselves Las Guadalupanas, meaning the people devoted to Our Lady 
o f Guadalupe.
The members o f El Centro have maintained their integrity to the present by 
remaining grassroots, relying on volunteers who collectively serve 1,100 hours per month 
and adhering to their two main goals: education of Hispanics, and preservation of their 
culture. With Jaime acting as liaison between the Church and the community, uniting 
Hispanic and Catholic activists, "there appears to be an ongoing connectedness between 
the Catholic Church and El Centro Cultural, though neither direct funding nor guidance 
is provided by the church. It is a connectedness, rather, of spirit and purpose"
(Freedman 1989, 1).
El Centro greatly aided the migrant and Hispanic communities. In the seventies 
El Centro provided a police-community relations class, arts and crafts classes, and a
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monthly newspaper (Slatta 1979, 162). In 1989 El Centro fed between 400 and 1,000 
people and served 225 people per day from Cornelius in legal aid, health care, job 
services, and other programs aimed at creating self-sufficiency. They also started two 
economic projects, one o f which made and sold tamales. The other was Ormetex, a 
non-profit piecework company working with Tektronix. Sister Mary Louise, who lived 
and worked at El Centro explained, "This is an opportunity to both become 
self-sufficient and to create jobs for our people" (Freedman 1989,1; Rural Tribune 
February 1979, 1).
Salud Medical Center, originally named Salud de la Familia, was also started in 
1972 by ex-migrants and seasonal workers. With a bilingual staff, it cared for clients 
from both the Hispanic and Anglo communities. The Center also visited migrant camps, 
bringing health care, distributing condoms, and informing the migrants about the hazards 
o f pesticides. Along with its other services Salud ran the largest government Women, 
Infant, and Children Project in Oregon (Martinis 1987, D10).
Activism in Woodburn did not end here. In 1984 volunteers set up a 24 hour 
beeper service for Hispanics in need. Their bilingual staff provided services for the 
Washington County Community Action Shelter in the hours when it was closed. They 
were there at night to serve the political refugees who often arrived in the dark. They 
did the little things that were horribly hard for a migrant or a non-English speaker: 
collecting a repossessed car, filling out an employment application, buying insurance for 
a car, or caring for someone who has been attacked at night (Cargill 1984, B l).
Recently others in the Woodburn community began to insist on fair treatment. 
Parents united, demanding that their children receive what they needed in the 
Woodburn public schools. They organized, clearly understanding the use of effective
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tactics, requesting specific programs such as advanced Spanish oriented for 
Spanish-speaking students, and bilingual school handbooks for parents. Some of the 
parents created a parent advisory committee, and when that was suspended for 
investigating complaints o f discrimination, these same parents continued the battle, 
joining together under another name (Ota 1984, A l).
Hispanics united in 1983, after a shooting death o f a migrant by police.
Hispanics all over Oregon demanded that a court certification program for interpreters 
be instituted. Hispanics in Woodburn also challenged the local police department, 
attempting to create a police review panel, and when the city rejected the plan, they 
declared they would demonstrate. They forced the city to comply with its agreement to 
hire a Hispanic policeman and to train officers in Spanish and cultural awareness. 
Statewide, the police began using a new Spanish "Miranda card," which previously had 
been stated in English o r in a broken Spanish that literally made little sense to 
Spanish-speakers.
Following this ordeal, th city tried to appease this force by setting up a panel 
consisting of 12 members, including four Hispanics. Although this was still only advisory 
it indicated that the Hispanics were a power to be contended with (O ta 1984, A l). The 
city also fired a conservative city administrator who had proved to be highly insensitive 
to the needs of the Hispanics in the city and, after a national search conducted by six lay 
persons, a more concilatory administrator, Mike Costine, was hired (Conrood 1985, B2).
The Hispanic community in Woodburn, centered around El Centro Cultural, the 
Salud Medical Clinic, and the House of Zion, remained the most thoroughly committed 
community in Oregon. Their grassroots efforts, community involvement and self-help 
emphasis express this. But, elsewhere in Oregon activism has also thrived, with Chicanos
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still leading the way. Since the Immigration Reform and Control Act o f 1986 private 
organizations have had to provide services that government funded agencies were no 
longer allowed to do. Following W oodburn’s example, other Catholic churches developed 
programs to help migrants and Hispanics, their involvement often directed towards 
empowering people through self-help programs. The following congregations had 
especially strong services for the migrants: St Patrick’s in Portland, St. Luke’s in 
W oodburn, St. Joseph’s in Salem, St Henry’s in Gresham, the Sisters o f the Holy Names 
at Marylhurst, and the Abbey at Mt Angel (Sansregret 1983, B3). There are  six Catholic 
Community Service Hispanic Programs in Oregon each helping between 300 and 600 
families each month in the summer (Perschiera 1990, 4M EP1).
Chicano activists encouraged the press to give coverage to the positive aspects of 
the growing Chicano population in Oregon and to the plight o f the migrant. When this 
was not effective Spanish publications were created, including La Voz Utiida (El Aguila 
publication), the Rural Tribune published by the Washington County Community Action 
Organization in Hillsboro, the bilingual paper, Informa, and the State Concilio (Slatta 
1979, 162).
Job training programs were started, with funding from local businesses. And 
Chicanos who have risen to good positions have continued to set up committees to 
m entor and foster relations with the business community and Hispanics for their people 
(Slatta 1975, 340). In the seventies the Chicano-Indian Study Center o f Oregon acquired 
10 buildings in Corvallis to begin a job-training center (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 116).
In the 1970s and 1980s numerous other Chicano organizational groups sprang up 
to deal with, among other things, migrant conditions, police relations, high school 
dropouts, and public relations. These groups were persistent in battling discrimination
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by local communities, the government, and the courts. Some of these groups include the 
Oregon Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, the Hispanic Political Action 
Committee, the Human Relations Commission, a Northwest chapter of IM AGE, 
(Incorporated Mexican-American Government Employees), COSSPO (Commission o f 
Spanish Speaking People of or from Oregon), and the Human Rights Action Council. 
These groups continue to provide leadership for Hispanics in Oregon. They will no 
doubt continue to lead the way in this most important mission.
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CONCLUSION
Hispanic farmworkers played an important role in the economy of Oregon, 
especially after the 1940s. They came in large numbers, increasingly replacing Anglo 
workers since the 1950s. As many Mexican-Americans were able to settle out, 
undocumented migrants took their place. Young men without their families 
outnumbered families in the fields, although children and spouses working beside some 
o f the men were not an uncommon sight. In the 1960s mechanization reduced, but did 
not eliminate, the number o f migrants.
The farmworkers’ wages were substandard and their survival generally a 
day-to-day struggle. Work conditions and wages remained unregulated under the 
NLRA, which helped workers in other jobs better their lives. Even the low wages the 
migrants were supposed to receive by law were not always given.
The same lax government regulations that allowed farmers freedom to pay 
whatever wages they wanted also perpetuated horrid living and working conditions.
These conditions were adverse to the health of the migrant. During the bracero program 
the government assembled temporary barracks which were inadequate for the weather. 
After the 1940s, when farmers took over the camps, living arrangements worsened.
Housing was crowded, unsanitary and inappropiate for the cold, wet springs and 
falls and hot summers. Workers were not protected from the chemicals sprayed on the
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crops and toilet facilities most often were non-existent. The work hours and location 
prevented the migrants from eating enough healthy food.
Migrants’ ability to improve their lives was also hindered by their lack of 
education. Many factors reduced the chance for this opportunity. For undocumented 
workers’ children this was an impossible task. But even for farmworkers who were U.S. 
citizens, work hours, travel, cultural differences, and prejudice worsened their chances 
for success in the school system.
Migrants who have ventured to Oregon over the last century in an effort to 
improve their lives have taken risks at every turn. Despite the great odds, some migrant 
families were able to encourage and help their children to succeed. Many of these same 
families moved out of the migrant stream, settling in small towns in Oregon. Although 
many have come only for the season, others have been able to stay, developing 
communities and struggling to retain or adapt their culture to their new needs.
These families created dynamic communities in Woodburn, Nyssa, Ontario, 
Cornelius, Gervais, and Hood River. A few of those who have stayed in Oregon have 
led the way in organizing the fight for those settled out as well as for those who are still 
migrating, whose living conditions have improved very little. Some o f  these ex-migrants’ 
children have in turn committed much effort to helping other migrants better their lives.
Ex-migrants and other community activists, both Chicano and Anglo, stuggled to 
help these proud and independent peoples. But other groups resisted this effort. 
Contractors, who made a living from the migrants, usually had a detrimental effect upon 
their lives. It is unfortunate that contractors and crewleaders were not completely 
banned, as they are in Wisconsin, where it has been one o f the underlying reasons why
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families have been able to become more self-sufficient, and why unionism has had a 
better opportunity to spawn (Wells 1976, 272).
Farm ers’ profits also were made from the backs o f these migrants. The cheaper 
they could keep this variable factor the better. And as the wealthiest farmers became 
m ore removed from their workers, they lost perspective on their effect upon the worker 
and the inhumane conditions they put upon them in exchange for the efficiency and 
profit they deemed necessary. The poorer farmers struggled hard to survive, blaming the 
cost of the migrants instead of the economic system.
The government, largely influenced by the desires o f the large farmers, continued 
to retain weak laws with insufficient legal punitive actions enforced by uncoordinated 
agencies. Overlapping authority within the government bureaucracy created limitations 
and confusion among those agencies responsible. And on the local level the small rural 
counties in which the migrants worked remained financially unable to fund programs 
which might have compensated for what the economy, and more specifically, the farmers’ 
low wages and housing conditions caused.
The role of the growers and contractors also remained unchecked, leaving it to 
the discretion of each individual involved, whose monetary interests often dictate his 
decision-making, regardless of its effects on the migrants. The economic outlook for 
migrants did and will continue to remain glum as long as competition within the 
American system and with corporations in the Third World persists, encouraging farmers 
to keep wages and the costs o f benefits and camp conditions low. Though some of the 
Chicano population will move out of migratory labor, others will take their place, 
sweating and struggling in the brutal heat o f eastern Oregon and the thick, damp mud of
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the W illamette Valley, moving through camps void of much comfort from harvest to 
harvest, from year to year without any fair return for their labor.
If  the government had not played a role in protecting the farmers one might 
imagine the possibility o f the farmworkers having a more equal footing and far greater 
power. Farmers might have been forced to contend with the needs o f the migrants in 
order to attract them to work if the government had not regularly stepped in to assure 
the farmers of cheap labor. But this did not happen. This lack of protection and lack of 
government support kept the migrants from obtaining any political, social or economic 
power.
A  new approach should be taken that allows farmers and workers to join 
together, realizing that the health o f one is the health o f the other. Farmers would do 
well to follow the lead o f the farmer Urban Eberhart in eastern Washington. On his 500 
acre farm he has initiated a more environmental approach to farming, using fewer 
chemicals and more natural controls. He helped to develop a new worker right-to-know 
program in cooperation with the state Department of Labor and Industries in 
Washington, Washington State University and the Farm Bureau (Rosemaiy 1989, G l).
If  even a small percentage of the amount of money that is allotted to agricultural 
research was redirected with this emphasis, solutions might be forthcoming.
Government research could be directed to find more efficient ways to remain labor 
intensive while providing a better life for workers. Research could center on labor 
intensive efficiency and self-sufficiency, emphasizing organic methods of production, 
which would further improve work conditions for the majority o f the people.
But, what must occur to set the improvements for migrants in motion is direct 
government support. The government must also, at bare minimum, provide protection
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to the farmworkers as they have for all other workers. This should include fair labor 
practices, including wages, the right to organize and strike, and safe field and housing 
conditions. The government or a union could set up a "hiring hall" to recontract out as 
they do in the seasonal building trades. Very stringent laws, or the elimination of 
contractors and crew leaders, should be put into place as well.
As it was, the best resistance the migrants had was their culture, their religion 
and their familial ties. Settled Hispanic communities located in the small towns nearby 
the fields the farmworkers picked across Oregon regularly refueled these bonds. Union 
activism and Chicano advocates also aided the migrants, often through legal cases they 
pushed through the courts. Religious and political Anglo activists added their political 
influence and know-how to this effort. They improved legislation, insisted on programs 
and provided services fo the migrants.
W ithout a drastic change in the performance o f the government and in the 
economic system, only some of the symptoms, instead o f the cause, will be eliminated. 
W hether this type of restructuring will happen depends on so many factors, but 
persistence by Chicano and other activists as well as by the migrants themselves is the 
answer. Maybe this should be Oregon’s new plan for "economic success."
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